The Power of Narratives: A Cultural History of US Involvement in Axis-Occupied Yugoslavia by Fouse, William P.
University of Rhode Island 
DigitalCommons@URI 
Open Access Master's Theses 
2018 
The Power of Narratives: A Cultural History of US Involvement in 
Axis-Occupied Yugoslavia 
William P. Fouse 
University of Rhode Island, william_fouse@my.uri.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses 
Recommended Citation 
Fouse, William P., "The Power of Narratives: A Cultural History of US Involvement in Axis-Occupied 
Yugoslavia" (2018). Open Access Master's Theses. Paper 1195. 
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses/1195 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Open Access Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, 
please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu. 
THE POWER OF NARRATIVES: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF US INVOLVEMENT 
IN AXIS-OCCUPIED YUGOSLAVIA 
BY 
WILLIAM P. FOUSE 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF ARTS 
IN 
HISTORY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 
2018 
 MASTER OF ARTS THESIS 
 
OF 
 
WILLIAM P. FOUSE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPROVED:  
 
Thesis Committee: 
 
Major Professor Robert W. Widell, Jr. 
 
   James Mace Ward 
 
   Valerie Karno 
    
      Nasser H. Zawia 
  DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 
2018 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
My thesis examines the ways in which narratives about Axis-occupied 
Yugoslavia developed within the United States over the course of World War II and 
identifies how these narratives influenced the development of American foreign 
policy.  Methodologically, I utilize the literary theories of Northrop Frye and Hayden 
White as a means of narrative analysis.  Frye categorizes narratives as romance, 
comedy, tragedy, or satire.  Each of these modes of employment serves as a call to 
action or, in the case of satire, inaction.  The initial narrative related to occupied 
Yugoslavia was romance, and it served as a call for the United States to aid the Četnik 
resistance.  The romantic narrative of Četnik resistance was, in part, supplanted by the 
romance of the communist Partisans due to the ways in which Četnik ideology 
conflicted with American ideals and the US government’s comedic narrative of 
national and international unity.  Many Americans became dissatisfied with US policy 
toward Yugoslavia and framed the cause of this dissatisfaction in terms of a moral 
failing, giving rise to the tragic narrative.  This narrative called for the United States to 
return to its ideals and assume a more constructive role in Yugoslavia.  However, the 
tragic narrative was ultimately undermined by the satirical narrative.  The satirical 
view of Yugoslavia drew upon preconceived notions of a Balkan propensity for 
violence and disorder.  It discouraged the US from becoming politically involved in 
Yugoslavia, and its emergence explains US foreign policy, or lack thereof, toward 
Yugoslavia at the end of World War II. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On August 26, 1946, The New York Times printed the review of an “odd little 
book,” George Orwell’s Animal Farm.  After walking its readers through Orwell’s 
critique of totalitarianism, the book review concluded by noting that the book served 
as reminder of the “ancient cycle of revolution—first brotherhood, then organization, 
then tyranny.”1  Neither the New York Times reviewer nor the rest of Orwell’s 
American audience was privy to the book’s original preface, which was omitted from 
both the US and British versions.  In it, Orwell castigated the complicity of “the 
English intelligentsia” in the uncritical propagation of Soviet propaganda.  The most 
egregious instance of this behavior was to be found in the treatment of General 
Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović, the leader of the Četnik resistance to the Axis occupation 
of Yugoslavia during World War II.  According to Orwell, 
the Russians, who had their own Yugoslav protege in Marshal Tito, 
accused [Mihailović] of collaboration with the Germans.  This 
accusation was promptly taken up by the British press: [Mihailović’s] 
supporters were given no chance of answering it and the facts 
contradicting it were simply kept out of print.  In July of 1943 the 
Germans offered a reward of 100,000 gold crowns for the capture of 
Tito, and similar reward for the capture of [Mihailović].  The British 
press ‘splashed’ the reward for Tito, but only one paper mentioned (in 
small print) the reward for [Mihailović]: and the charges of 
collaborating with the Germans continued.2 
 
At the time that Animal Farm was published, Orwell’s original preface would have  
undoubtedly found a receptive audience in the United States.  The month prior to the  
                                               
1 Orville Prescott, “Books of the Times,” New York Times, August 26, 1946, accessed February 3, 2018, 
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1946/08/26/93148803.html?pageNumber=33. 
2 George Orwell, “The Freedom of the Press,” 1945, Orwell Archive, University College London 
Library, Special Collections, 3, accessed February 3, 2018, https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/orwells-
proposed-introduction-to-animal-farm.   
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release of Animal Farm in the US, Mihailović was executed in Yugoslavia after being  
found guilty of “treason against the people and the Fatherland” in the form of 
“political and military collaboration with the invader.”3  
The government and private citizens of the United States attempted to intercede 
on Mihailović’s behalf in 1946.  In response to a radio announcement in Belgrade that 
Mihailović had been captured on March 13, the State Department sent a message to 
the Yugoslav Foreign Office.  The note proclaimed that Mihailović “organized and led 
important resistance forces against the occupiers… [and] without adequate supplies 
and fighting under the greatest hardships contributed with his forces materially to the 
allied cause so heroically participated in by Yugoslavia.”  In closing, the message 
stated that the US government was “confident that in the interests of justice the 
Yugoslav Government” would avail itself of the evidence that was currently being 
compiled within the United States in defense of Mihailović.4  The Yugoslav 
government was not receptive to this appeal and replied that “the crimes of the traitor 
Draza Mihailovich against the people of Yugoslavia are far too big and horrible that it 
could be or should be allowed to be discussed whether he is guilty or not.”5 
In light of the United States’ encouragement of Yugoslav resistance to the Axis  
                                               
3 The Trial of Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović: Stenographic Record and Documents from the Trial of 
Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović (Belgrade: The Union of the Journalists’ Associations of the Federative 
People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 1946), 507.  
4 United States Department of State, “U.S. Note on the Capture of General Mikhailovich,” The 
Department of State Bulletin 14, no. 354 (April 14, 1946): 634, accessed February 3, 2018, 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=osu.32435031338353;view=1up;seq=636.  This evidence, which 
consisted of testimony by American military personnel, was published as Committee for a Fair Trial for 
Draja Mihailovich, The Question of the Guilt or the Innocence of General Mihailovich: Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry of the Committee for a Fair Trial for Draja Mihailovich (New York: 1946), 
accessed January 10, 2018, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015020457944;view 
=1up;seq=3.  
5 United States Department of State, “Yugoslav Reply to U.S. Note on General Mikhailovich,” The 
Department of State Bulletin 14, no. 355 (April 21, 1946): 669, accessed February 3, 2018, 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiuo.ark:/13960/t3fx8vf3m;view=1up;seq=677.    
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powers over the course of World War II, it is understandable that the US government 
felt compelled to assist Mihailović.  Following the invasion of Yugoslavia, the United 
States and Britain originally supported Mihailović as the leader of the Yugoslav 
resistance against the occupation forces.  However, from the emergence of concerted 
resistance activity in Yugoslavia in 1941 through mid-1943, this support was largely 
moral rather than material.6  By the time that the US government was prepared to send 
military representatives and more substantial aid to Yugoslavia, the Allies had become 
aware of a rival resistance organization, the communist-led Partisans headed by Josip 
Broz “Tito.”7  The US government initially sent military liaisons to both groups.8  
However, in 1944, the US and Britain withdrew their joint military mission to 
Mihailović and gave their full support to Tito.9  By the end of the war, the Partisans’ 
military superiority to Mihailović’s royalist Četniks placed Tito in a position to reject 
the return of the Yugoslav king and to seize political control of postwar Yugoslavia.10  
This sequence of events led many to ask why it was that the United States had not only 
abandoned its erstwhile military ally, but also apparently played a part in bringing 
                                               
6 Hugh de Santis, “In Search of Yugoslavia: Anglo-American Policy and Policy-Making 1943-45,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 3 (July, 1981): 542, accessed August 18, 2017, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/260320. 
7 A total of approximately 23 tons of supplies had been dropped to Mihailović by June 1943.  Walter B. 
Roberts, Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 119.  
Once the Allies began shipping supplies from the Italian coast in 1943, their ability to aid the resistance 
forces expanded significantly.  The Partisans were the primary beneficiaries.  They received over 5,600 
tons of supplies between October 1943 and January 1944.  The Četniks received only 27 tons of 
supplies over this same time period.  Andrew Buchanan, American Grand Strategy in the 
Mediterranean during World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 244. 
8 The first Office of Strategic Service liaisons parachuted into Yugoslavia in August 1943.  They were 
initially assigned to the British missions that had already been established with both Tito and 
Mihailović.  Kirk Ford, Jr., OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 1941-1945 (College Station, Texas A&M 
University Press, 1992), 3-4.   
9 After the departure of the British mission, and much to the chagrin of Churchill, the United States 
maintained a presence among the Četniks in the form of two subsequent missions, though neither was 
tasked with aiding Mihailović.  One was strictly an intelligence mission and the other was tasked with 
evacuating downed US airmen.  The personnel associated with these missions were withdrawn in 
November and December of 1944.  This severed all direct US contact with Mihailović.  Ibid., 131-133.   
10 Ibid., 31.   
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about the rise of the communist regime that subsequently tried and executed him.  It is 
this question that lies at the heart of this paper.       
In his explanation of US policy on Yugoslavia, David Martin, who served as 
secretary for the Commission of Inquiry that had compiled the above-mentioned 
testimony of US servicemen in defense of Mihailović in 1946, arrived at a conclusion 
similar to that of George Orwell.  However, the communist influence that Martin 
identified was far more extensive than even Orwell suggested.  As Martin wrote in 
Ally Betrayed, 
even in the heart of democratic England and America, the Soviets are 
able to exercise certain totalitarian controls in their own interest.  
Employing… the influence of party-members and fellow [travelers] in 
key positions… they were able to compel the suppression of news, to 
obtain the currency of expedient lies, and even to contrive the 
falsification of British and American military intelligence.  The simple 
fact is that Britain and America were duped into supporting Tito.11 
 
Martin’s assertions were not merely a manifestation of anti-communist hysteria driven 
by fears associated with the emerging Cold War, although they undoubtedly were a 
reflection of this as well.  There is substantial evidence of the presence of communists 
and their ideological sympathizers within the ranks of both the British Special 
Operations Executive (SOE) and its American counterpart, the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS).  Possible infiltration of the OSS aside, if there was a decisive 
communist influence on British policy from within the SOE, this would invariably 
have impacted US policy.  Wherever British policy led in Yugoslavia, at least in 
regard to military liaison and supply operations, the Americans invariably followed, 
though often not immediately or without protest.  This can be seen in the initial 
                                               
11 David Martin, Ally Betrayed: The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailovich (New York: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1946), 4. 
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decision to back both Tito and Mihailović, as well as in the eventual decision to 
remove all Allied liaisons from the Četniks.12   
There has been particular attention paid to the influence that James Klugmann, a 
Soviet mole within the SOE, had upon Allied policy toward the Yugoslav resistance 
groups.  In one of his later books, Web of Disinformation, Martin argued that 
Klugmann was “primarily [Martin’s emphasis] responsible” for the “handing over [of] 
a nation [Yugoslavia] of 15 million people to Communist control” through the 
manipulation of intelligence information in favor of the Partisans.13  In his memoir, 
The Rape of Serbia, Michael Lees, one of the British liaison officers assigned to 
Mihailović, recounted his apoplectic reaction upon reading Basil Davidson’s account 
of the “shenanigans” in which Davidson and fellow leftist members of SOE, to include 
Klugmann, engaged at the British headquarters in Cairo, ultimately leading “to 
Churchill’s dramatic modification of Yugoslav policy” in favor of the Partisans.14   
While there is substantial evidence that Klugmann’s communist sympathies drove 
his activities within SOE, historian Roderick Bailey questioned the extent of 
Klugmann’s influence upon policy.  That Klugmann perceived that he wielded 
significant influence upon policy is shown in Bailey’s essay, “Communist in SOE.”  
In a conversation, which Bailey suspected was captured by British intelligence via a 
listening device, between Klugmann and a member of the British Communist Party, 
Klugmann explained that 
the first political aim was to get permission for our Yugoslav section to  
                                               
12 Ford, OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 181. 
13 David Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder (San Diego, California: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990), xix.   
14 Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-1944 (San Diego, 
California: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1990), 18-25. 
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learn from Intelligence sources about Partisans, to show that there were 
Partisans as well as Chetniks.  That took about three months - a fight 
with the Foreign Office and War Office, and GHQ Middle East. 
 The second step was to get permission to send certain agents not 
only to the Chetniks but to the Partisans… that was another three 
months, fighting, persuading, documents organizing, every type of 
work. 
 The next three months was to get permission to send arms to the 
people that were Partisans as well as arms to the Chetniks. 
 The next three months, four months about, was to get 
permission to send people to support the Partisans in Serbia, which was 
the area where Mihailovitch was strongest.  Previously we’d only been 
allowed to send them to other areas. 
 The next stage—again for four or five months—was… skewing 
[and] building up reports we were getting from the Chetniks and… 
from the Partisans - [to show that there was] no activity against the 
enemy on the Chetnik side, [but] first-class activity on the Partisan side 
- [in order] to recall the missions from the Chetniks, and to give all 
support to the Partisans. 
 And the last stage… was to fight inside the organisation [for]… 
political recognition of the Partisans.15 
 
Although Klugmann gave himself and his machinations credit for the shift in British 
policy as it related to the Partisans, Bailey was skeptical of this assertion.  According 
to Bailey, the “key decisions in favour of Tito were taken well above the heads of 
SOE” and were based upon “important intelligence to which the SOE staff officers 
had little or no access.”16   
Bailey’s dismissal of Klugmann’s significance was reflective of the increasing  
credence given by historians to the claim that the ULTRA intercepts were far more  
influential in the formulation of British policy toward Yugoslavia than were any  
                                               
15 Roderick Bailey, “Communist in SOE: Explaining James Klugmannn’s Recruitment and Retention,” 
in The Politics and Strategy of Clandestine War: Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946, ed. Neville 
Wylie (London: Routledge, 2012), 69-70.  The “organisation” to which Klugmann referred was the 
SOE.   
16 Ibid., 71.  “ULTRA” was the name given to the Anglo-American decrypts of German, Italian, and 
Japanese communications.  In May 1943, the British and Americans agreed to a “full exchange and 
distribution of Signals Intelligence.” Martin Gilbert, The Second World War: A Complete History, rev. 
ed. (New York, NY:  Holt Paperbacks, 2004), 429. 
 7 
 
reports from the SOE.17  Historian Heather Williams even suggested in Parachutes, 
Patriots, and Partisans that Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, a member of British 
Parliament and also head of the SOE mission to Tito, possibly served as a cover to 
explain Churchill’s decision to switch support to Partisans and mask Churchill’s 
reliance upon ULTRA intercepts as the basis for the change in Yugoslav policy.18 
Kirk Ford, Jr. made clear in OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance that communist 
influence was not limited to the SOE.  According to Ford, the OSS headquarters in 
Bari, Italy gained the epithet of the “Little Kremlin” due to the influence of Partisan 
sympathizers such as Major Francis Arnoldy, chief of the OSS Secret Intelligence (SI) 
Yugoslav section.19  Robert Joyce, one of Arnoldy’s predecessors as chief of the 
Yugoslav section, recounted in his unpublished memoir that he was informed prior to 
assuming his post in Cairo that several of his employees were “probable communists 
or at least fellow travelers.”  This was of concern, as SI “was supposed to report 
objectively military and especially political developments for American military and 
political policymakers.”20  Joyce had assumed overall head of SI in Bari and was thus 
Arnoldy’s supervisor.  He eventually had Arnoldy transferred for not following State 
Department policy and for his unabashedly “pro-Partisan” activity.21  It thus seems 
that the US personnel were cognizant of communist infiltration within the OSS and 
increasingly wary of and proactive in neutralizing such influences in comparison to 
their SOE counterparts.  The awareness of American personnel of communist 
                                               
17 John Cripps, “Mihailović or Tito? How the Codebreakers Helped Churchill Choose,” in Action this 
Day, eds. Ralph Erskine and Michael Smith (New York: Bantam Press, 2001), 262-3. 
18 Heather Williams, Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans: The Special Operations Executive in 
Yugoslavia 1941- 1945 (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 168. 
19 Ford, OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 82. 
20 Robert Prather Joyce, “Chapter Twelve - Yugoslav Resistance 1941-1944,” Robert P. Joyce Papers, 
Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, 3. 
21 Ford, OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 85. 
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infiltration at the time, combined with the recent recognition of the importance of the 
ULTRA intercepts, has increasingly led scholars to dismiss the impact of communist 
influence on the trajectory of US and British policy toward Yugoslavia during World 
War II. 
Rather than crediting communist conspiracy as the driver of US policy-making, 
many historians have instead emphasized the role played by military exigency.  As 
Walter Roberts stated in Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945, “the United 
States had only military and strategic considerations in mind in the Balkans.  It 
believed that if Tito was fighting and Mihailović was not, then Tito should be 
supported.”22  While Roberts did mention communist propaganda, he attributed little 
significance to it.  For instance, Radio Free Yugoslavia, broadcasting from the Soviet 
Union, began accusing Mihailović of collaboration in 1942.  This accusation was then 
quickly picked up by the communist periodical, The Daily Worker, in the United 
States.23  As Roberts noted, by late 1942, mainstream publications such as The 
Saturday Evening Post and Time began publishing articles that praised the Partisans 
and repeated the accusations of military inactivity and collaboration on the part of 
Mihailović.  However, Roberts stated that “the US government… dismissed all of 
these charges and continued to credit Mihailović with all resistance in Yugoslavia.”24  
Instead, Roberts emphasized the impact of a report by Major Linn Farish, an OSS 
liaison with Tito, that FDR received immediately prior to the Tehran Conference.  
During this conference, the decision was ultimately made to switch full Allied support 
to Tito.  Roberts claimed that the report “dramatically changed FDR’s view of the 
                                               
22 Roberts, Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 184.   
23 Ibid., 62.   
24 Ibid., 75-6. 
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Yugoslav situation.”  In describing this impact, Roberts paid particular attention to the 
portions of the report that deemphasized the communist character of the Partisans 
while extolling their dedication to fighting the Axis.  Roberts also quoted Farish’s 
observations on the Četniks’ consistent failure to attack the occupiers and their 
preoccupation with fighting the Partisans.25 
Ford, despite his previously mentioned description of communist infiltration of 
the OSS, also identified military concerns as the foundation of US decision-making on 
Yugoslavia and dismissed the notion that communists significantly influenced 
policy.26  At the time of the Tehran Conference,  “the current status of the war… 
dictated the necessity of according primacy to military over political matters” in the 
formulation of US policy.27  Unlike Roberts, Ford dismissed even the impact of the 
Farish report and concluded that it “had little, or any, impact on the course of Allied 
policy.”28  Instead, this report merely served as confirmation of the wisdom of FDR’s 
efforts to stay out of the Balkans and thus avoid becoming entangled with suspected 
British designs in the region with which the United States disagreed.29                      
The trajectory of the historiography, as outlined above, demonstrates an increased 
focus upon geo-political and strategic concerns with a simultaneous deemphasis of the 
historical significance of narratives as they related to American involvement in 
Yugoslavia.  Also, as indicated by Roberts’ evaluation of the lack of impact that the 
US press had upon American policy, this historiographical trend belies the 
significance of the contemporary emotive valence of certain categorizations, such as 
                                               
25 Ibid., 152.   
26 Ford, OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 183. 
27 Ibid., 181. 
28 Ibid., 35.   
29 Ibid., 12.   
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collaborator and resister or communist and reactionary.  The largely discredited 
historiographical obsession with the influence of communist propaganda, whatever its 
faults, at least recognized the tendency of narratives to shape action.  This recognition 
explains the preoccupation of those like Martin with the ways in which communist 
propaganda came to be repeated in the mainstream press and within governmental 
circles.  This recognition also meant that those who fixated upon communist influence 
were often more attentive to the link between domestic discourse and international 
developments. 
In the pages that follow, it is not my intention to resurrect the historiographical 
bogeyman of communist subversion, but rather to recenter the narrative as an 
historically significant factor in understanding US-Yugoslav relations during World 
War II.  It is not my contention that these narratives served as the sole impetus for US 
policy.  Instead, I argue that narratives represented a rhetorical and imaginative arena 
that served as the space in which policy regarding Yugoslavia was formed.  The 
boundaries of this space were not fixed, and private citizens and governmental 
officials contended with one another in their attempts to circumscribe or expand them.  
This contest was informed by and appealed to the ideals, aspirations, preconceptions, 
and anxieties of its participants and audience. 
According to historian Warren F. Kimball, World War II has increasingly been 
viewed “as little more than the origins of the Cold War,” but this context can be 
overemphasized as it relates to foreign policy and public opinion during World War  
 11 
 
II.30  Although George F. Kennan would not coin the term “containment” until 1947,  
curtailing Soviet expansion nonetheless weighed upon the mind of Roosevelt 
throughout World War II.31  As I show in the chapters that follow, it also concerned 
members of the American press and the Yugoslav government-in-exile (YGE), as one 
area into which Soviet influence seemed to be encroaching was occupied Yugoslavia.  
However, this concern led some to subsequently confuse hindsight with foresight in 
explaining US decision-making regarding Yugoslavia during the Second World War.  
For example, diplomat Robert Murphy claimed that US knowledge of Tito’s Yugoslav 
nationalism meant that the US anticipated Tito’s eventual break with Stalin in 1948, 
thus presumably demonstrating the wisdom of the United States’ foreign policy during 
World War II.32  However, as Partisan leader Milovan Djilas noted in his memoir 
Wartime, Tito never gave the Western powers reason to doubt his “ideological link 
with the USSR.”33   
Instead of narrowing the historical lens to focus upon US concerns about the 
spread of communism, expanding the scope of historical inquiry regarding US-
Yugoslav relations during World War II has the potential to identify trends within US 
foreign policy that transcend the Cold War context.  According to historians Michael 
Patrick Cullinane and David Ryan, US foreign policy has often been articulated by 
juxtaposing the image of the United States against “an ‘other,’” that is “a simplified 
depiction” of the culture in question.  Cullinane and Ryan also called attention to the 
                                               
30 Warren F. Kimball, “The Second Word War: Not (Just) the Origins of the Cold War,” in War and 
Cold War in American Foreign Policy, eds. Dale Carter and Robin Clifton (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 
31. 
31 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 4.   
32 Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (New York: Pyramid, 1965), 249.   
33 Milovan Djilas, Wartime (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1977), 348. 
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“notion of superiority and inferiority running through such discourse.”34  Although the 
language used in this discourse has evolved from one “of racial hierarchies, 
civilization, and barbarism” to one of “development, modernity, and tradition… the 
hierarchy” has remained “the same.”35  Despite the fact that there is a “government 
monopoly” on the formulation and execution of US foreign policy, political scientist 
Charles O. Lerche, Jr. noted that US policy must nonetheless take into account “the 
demands of the democratic public.”36  In this way, defining “us” and the “other,” and 
determining what constitutes the proper relationship between these two entities, can be 
seen as a process engaged in by both the American government and public.  The 
development of narratives related to occupied Yugoslavia exemplifies this process.   
Methodologically, I utilize the narrative theory of Hayden White and literary  
theory of Northrop Frye.37  I categorize the evolution of wartime narratives about  
Yugoslavia using the “modes of emplotment" identified by Frye and used as means of 
historiographical criticism by Hayden White: romance, tragedy, comedy, and satire.38  
I describe the characteristics of these narratives in detail at the beginning of each of 
the following chapters.   
                                               
34 Michael Patrick Cullinane and David Ryan, introduction to U.S. Foreign Policy and the Other, eds. 
Michael Patrick Cullinane and David Ryan (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 2. 
35 Ibid., 5.   
36 Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy and the American People (Englewood Cliff, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958), 3. 
37 These theories can be found, respectively, in Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination 
in 19th-Century Europe, Fortieth-Anniversary Edition (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University 
Press, 2014) and Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays, 15th ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2000).  In Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1986), Lynn Hunt demonstrates the usefulness of Frye’s 
categorization of narratives in charting the evolution of how French society understood the French 
Revolution.  Specifically, she demonstrates the evolution of narratives about the revolution as they 
progressed from, according to the descriptions provided by Frye, comedy, to romance, and then to 
tragedy.  Drawing upon Hunt’s utilization of Frye, James Krapfl also demonstrates the usefulness of 
Frye’s and White’s literary theories to cultural history in James Krapfl, Revolution with a Human Face: 
Politics, Culture, and Community Czechoslovakia, 1989-1992 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
38 White, Metahistory, 7.  
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The ways in which Americans spoke and wrote about occupied Yugoslavia, and 
thus contributed to the emergence and perpetuation of certain narratives, not only 
reflected their own evolving views and ideals, but also contributed to a wider 
discourse.  The trajectory of this discourse, in turn, served as a call for a particular US 
policy of action or inaction in Yugoslavia.39  Thus, an examination of these narratives 
has the potential to provide insight into not only the prevailing mentalité among 
different segments of US society that were concerned with the course of events in 
Yugoslavia, but also how these mentalités interacted with US foreign policy. 
The sources that I use to identify the genesis and propagation of relevant 
narratives tend to be those generated by what historian Benjamin Alpers refers to as 
“cultural producers.”  According to Alpers, this “heterogenous set of cultural elites” 
was able to define American views through either “access to the mass media [or] of 
having expert status.”40  This included members of the mainstream and foreign 
language press, US and foreign government officials, and prominent citizens, such as 
Louis Adamic and Ruth Mitchell.  As will be seen, communists played an outsized 
role as successful “cultural producers.”  However, rather than focusing upon this 
success as the result of some insidious conspiracy, I instead place it within the context 
of competing viewpoints.  When analyzed from this perspective, the significance of 
communist rhetoric was not that it contributed to the installation of a communist 
regime in Yugoslavia, but rather that Americans were more receptive and sympathetic 
                                               
39 Hunt describes the rhetoric of the French Revolution as not merely reflective of “changes and 
conflict, but rather was itself transformed into an instrument of political and social change.”  Hunt, 
Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, 24.  Narratives can also be an impediment to 
change.  As Krapfl notes, “in satirical emplotments, human agency is an illusion and political action is 
therefore pointless.”  Krapfl, Revolution with a Human Face, 22.  Both of these observations are useful 
in examining the impact of narratives on the formulation of US policy toward Yugoslavia. 
40 Benjamin Alpers, Dictators, Democracy, and American Public Culture: Envisioning the Totalitarian 
Enemy 1920’s-1950s (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 2.   
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to the narratives they propagated in pursuit of these ends.  In contrast, the narratives 
produced by Mihailović’s supporters failed to either generate or maintain a similar 
degree of support because they did not resonate with either the American public or 
governmental officials to the same degree as those of their competitors. 
In the first chapter of this thesis I examine the emergence of the romantic 
narrative that portrayed Mihailović as a paragon of European resistance to Nazi 
domination.  I argue that the initial receptivity to this narrative was based upon 
established American notions about the fighting spirit of the heroic, but primitive, 
Serbians.  I believe that this is a manifestation of what Maria Todorova termed 
“balkanism,” which both served and then undermined the cause of Mihailović’s 
American proponents.41  I also provide an historical overview of US diplomatic and 
military involvement in Yugoslavia leading up to the emergence of organized 
resistance.  This is important for establishing the wider context in which US narratives 
about Yugoslavia arose.  In doing so, I attempt to ensure that in the process of 
emphasizing the significance of these narratives, I do not simultaneously 
decontextualize US foreign policy decisions from the very real strategic and geo-
political concerns with which American policymakers had to contend. 
In chapter three, I examine the ways in which the heroic image of Mihailović was 
eroded through accusations that he was not only collaborating with the Axis, but that 
he was also a reactionary Serb chauvinist. As I show, these qualities increasingly came 
into conflict with the comedic narrative that was promoted by the US government to 
combat disunity within the domestic Yugoslav-American community, the YGE, and 
between Tito’s and Mihailović’s forces. I also examine how the competing romantic 
                                               
41 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1. 
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narrative of Tito and the Partisans arose at the same time that Mihailović’s heroism 
was being called into question. 
Chapter four consists of an examination of the ironic and tragic narratives about 
Yugoslavia. I argue that Yugoslav disunity served to confirm American beliefs 
regarding the Balkans in yet another manifestation of balkanism, which in turn 
discouraged US involvement in Yugoslavia’s internal political disputes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
MIHAILOVIĆ ASCENDANT: THE ROMANCE OF RESISTANCE 
 
The cover of the May 25, 1942 issue of Time magazine bore the image of a 
uniformed military man with a furrowed brow.  He appeared to be middle-aged and 
wore a trimmed mustache but was otherwise clean-shaven.  In the background stood 
the entrance of a cave, where an armed soldier looked out over a distant valley.  While 
Time stated that this painting of Mihailović was rendered by one of his compatriots, it 
bore little resemblance to the 50-year old, bespectacled man with an unruly and 
greying beard who was currently waging guerrilla warfare within Yugoslavia.  The 
cover’s corresponding article, entitled “The Eagle of Yugoslavia,” informed its readers 
that Mihailović was the leader of what was “probably the greatest guerrilla operation 
in history” and that “as a legend, Draža Mihailovich will unquestionably live as long 
as World War II is remembered.”   Time’s visual depiction of Mihailović and the 
hyperbolic description of his exploits are representative of the way in which the 
majority of the rest of US press originally presented the story of Yugoslav resistance 
to the American public.  Unfortunately for Mihailović and those within the United 
States that championed his cause, the reality of the Yugoslavian conflict and the 
activities and goals of the Četnik movement came into increasing conflict with this 
simplistic narrative of Serbian heroism.42 
Among the “modes of emplotment” that White suggests are available to the  
                                               
42 “The Eagle of Yugoslavia,” World Battlefronts, Time 39, no. 21 (May 25, 1942), 22, accessed 
January 10, 2018, http://time.com/vault/issue/1942-05-25/page/24/.   
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narrator of historical events, the initial portrayal of Mihailović’s resistance to Nazi 
occupation can best be described as romance.43  According to Frye, the romantic 
narrative is based upon chivalric “knight-errantry.”44  Krapfl interprets romance as “a 
quest, a heroic struggle between good and evil.”45  In the romance, the heroic 
protagonist is capable of “marvelous” actions because the “the ordinary laws of nature 
are slightly suspended.”46  In this chapter, I first discuss preconceptions of the Balkans 
in general, and the Serbs in particular, as an explanation for the alacrity with which the 
US press adopted romance as the framework for its portrayal of Mihailović.  I then 
provide an overview of American involvement in Yugoslavia leading up to the point 
of the Nazi invasion.  After describing the impetus for the emergence of resistance in 
Yugoslavia, I look at the way in which Mihailović was initially presented to the 
American public.  As will be seen, the romantic narrative and the specific components 
used in its construction were problematic as a framework for understanding, and 
establishing expectations of, the Četnik resistance. 
According to Maria Todorava’s concept of “balkanism,” Western views of the  
Balkans were informed by and reflected in “a discourse of imputed ambiguity.”47  This  
                                               
43 White, Metahistory, 7. 
44 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays, 15th ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 34. 
45 Krapfl, Revolution with a Human Face, 15.   
46 Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, 33. 
47 As opposed to Edward Said’s concept of “orientalism, which is a discourse about an imputed 
opposition” between East and West.  Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 17.  One of the primary 
“channels and safeguards of balkanism as an ideal type” was the travelogue.  Ibid., 19.  The very term 
“Balkan” as a geographic identifier within the English language can be traced to one such travelogue 
written by a British traveler in the late eighteenth century.  Ibid., 22.  This genre continued to be an 
influential source of information on Yugoslavia through the outbreak of World War II.  Perhaps the 
most significant of these works at the time of the war was Rebecca West’s anti-German, pro-Serbian 
Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (1941), which met with significant critical acclaim within the United 
States.  An example of the many positive reviews of West’s book within the US press can be found in 
Katherine Woods, “Rebecca West’s Brilliant Mosaic of Yugoslavian Travel,” New York Times, October 
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ambiguity stemmed from the Balkans state of liminality, or in-betweeness, in regard to  
its geography, culture, and racial makeup.48  Sitting astride a civilizational crossroads, 
Yugoslavia was culturally and ethnically diverse.  It included within its population 
predominantly Catholic Croats and Slovenes, Orthodox Serbs, and a substantial 
Muslim minority.49  Developmentally, the Balkans had not achieved Western 
standards of modernity, but were instead in an “intermediary state somewhere between 
barbarity and civilization.”50  While the relegation of the Balkans to such a 
comparatively primitive state bore with it ostensibly negative connotations, 
particularly in regard to a presumed propensity for violence, there could be ambiguity 
here as well.  According to Eugene Michail, “Western attitudes” toward Balkan 
violence “changed according to cross-national and ideological or national and strategic 
priorities, producing a variety of images that competed, co-existed and alternated 
between different sections of the Western public.”51 
The most visible US attitude toward the potential for Balkan bellicosity at the 
time of the German invasion of Yugoslavia can best be described as a manifestation of 
Serbophilia.  Historian Ivo Tasovac traces this American Serbophilia to the 
Romanticism of the late nineteenth century, when Romantics developed a vision of 
                                                                                                                                       
26, 1941, accessed January 30, 2018, 
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1941/10/26/99322995.html?pageNumber=52.   
48 Ibid., 18.  The term “liminality” was coined by Arnold van Gennep and developed by anthropologists, 
most notably Victor W. Turner, in their analysis of the transitional phase of rites of passage.  Edward 
Muir, Ritual in Early Modern Europe, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 21-22.   
49 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia (New York: Praeger, 1971), 55.   
50 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 130.  An example of this view can be found in West’s explanation 
for what she perceives as Yugoslav ignorance regarding capitalism and trade unionism.  This ignorance 
was an inevitable result of that fact that “when the industrial revolution had dawned on the Western 
powers, the Serbs were Turkish slaves; to this day eighty-seven per cent of Yugoslavs are agricultural 
workers.”  Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: The Record of a Journey through Yugoslavia 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 494.   
51 Eugene Michail, “Western Attitudes to War in the Balkans and the Shifting Meanings of Violence, 
1912-91,” Journal of Contemporary History 47, no. 2 (April 2012): 221, accessed December 11, 2017, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23249185. 
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Serbian preeminence among the South Slavs that found sympathy and took root in an 
American society “that was going through its own romantic development of Anglo-
Saxon racial nationalism.”  Serbian participation in the Balkan Wars and World War I 
served to further entrench within the American imagination an image of the Serb as 
“an innately heroic person—natural, undisciplined, and in love with personal 
freedom.”52 
 
FROM CREATION TO DISMEMBERMENT 
 
Although the United States supported the creation of Yugoslavia in the immediate 
aftermath of World War I and defended the nascent state against territorial 
encroachment by the Italians, this American flirtation with Wilsonian internationalism 
was not to survive the interwar years.53  The negligible economic ties between the two 
countries undoubtedly contributed to the fact that Yugoslavia remained on the 
                                               
52 Ivo Tasovac, American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 1939-1941 (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1999), 11-13. 
53 Point XI of Wilson’s Fourteen Points made explicit mention of Serbia and Montenegro, both of 
which were ultimately to form a part of Yugoslavia.  This same point also called for the establishment 
of Balkan states “along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality” and that 
“international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the 
several Balkan states should be entered into.”  Woodrow Wilson, “President Woodrow Wilson's 
Fourteen Points,” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy, accessed December 
20, 2017, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp.  Wilson’s Fourteen Points were 
received with considerable enthusiasm by many South Slavs.  This is indicated by the words of one 
Croatian writer who proclaimed that Wilson was “like Christ” in bringing “the good news first and 
foremost to the small and the weak.”  Josip Horvat, Politička povijest Hrvatske, vol. II, (Zagreb: August 
Cesarec, 1991), 19, quoted in Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 
1804-2011 (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 364.  On February 2, 1919, the United States was the 
first of the World War I powers to recognize what was then called the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, 53.  In exchange for joining the Allies in World War I, Italy was 
promised territory along the eastern Adriatic in what would become Yugoslavia.  Wilson vigorously 
protested this as a violation of the principles laid forth in his Fourteen Points.  However, this bought 
Yugoslavia only temporary reprieve from Italy’s territorial demands.  In 1920, the Yugoslavs finally 
made significant territorial concessions to the Italians.  Glenny, The Balkans, 369-377.   Dissatisfaction 
over the denial of Italy’s territorial ambitions along the eastern Adriatic following World War I, in 
which over 600,000 Italians were killed, contributed significantly to Mussolini’s rise to power.  
MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 33.          
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periphery of US foreign policy concerns for most of this period.54  US relations with 
Yugoslavia were also reflective of a more general trend within American diplomacy.  
The Great Depression and disillusionment regarding US participation in First World 
War had left Americans with little appetite for involvement in European affairs.  If this 
was true for Western Europe, it was doubly so for the Balkans.  As historian George 
C. Herring notes, the United States “scrupulously avoided the numerous, complex, and 
volatile issues that divided peoples and governments against each other.”55  This 
policy dovetailed nicely with the prevailing isolationist sentiments in America at the 
outset of World War II.56  However, with the Nazi conquest of France and the Low 
Countries in 1940, a realization grew among Americans that their own security was at 
risk and that direct US involvement in the war was increasingly likely.57   
Axis aggression in the Balkans precipitated unprecedented American interest and 
involvement in Yugoslav affairs.  In pursuit of his expansionist ambitions for 
                                               
54 Robert McCormick, Croatia under Ante Pavelić: America, the Ustaše and Croatian Genocide (New 
York: I. B. Tauris, 2014), 2-3.  Yugoslavia was also in default on its $62 million dollar war debt.  
Vladimir Petrov, A Study in Diplomacy: The Story of Arthur Bliss Lane (Washington, D.C.: Public 
Affairs Press, 1971), 104.  The Johnson Act forbid the United States to grant any loans to governments 
that were in default on payments to the US Treasury.  David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The 
American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 390.   
55 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relation since 1776 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 462. For American diplomats in Yugoslavia, this meant that they were 
to act as “listening posts” while refraining from any interference in domestic issues.  According to the 
biographer of the American minister in Belgrade, Arthur Bliss Lane, “years sometimes passed without a 
single [State] Department message to the legation.”  The use of Belgrade as a listening post is dubious, 
as nobody had the interest to read or the expertise to interpret the significance of most of the messages 
coming out of Yugoslavia.  Petrov, A Study in Diplomacy, 103-107. 
56 Ivo Tasovac, American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 1939-1941 (College Station: Texas A & M 
University Press, 1999), 26.   
57 France fell to Germany in June 1940.  That same month, opinion polls indicated that support for a 
peacetime draft had increased from 50 to 64 percent.  Roosevelt then began supporting such a measure 
in public.  Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1979), 231-232.  Also, in November, polls indicated that during Roosevelt’s 
re-election for a third term as president, voters would have preferred his opponent by a margin of 5.5 
percent if there had been no war.  However, they preferred Roosevelt by 18 percent if the United States 
were to go to war.  This indicates that his victory was, at least in part, based not upon his continued 
promise that the United States would not enter the war, but was instead a result of the American 
electorate’s assumptions about the likelihood that the US would be drawn into the war regardless of the 
president’s assurances to the contrary.  Ibid., 231-232. 
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Mediterranean hegemony, Mussolini ordered the invasion of Greece on October 28, 
1940.58  While Hitler was not opposed to Italy’s attack on Greece in principle, his 
approval for such an undertaking was predicated upon the assumption of its military 
success.59  Instead, poor preparation, in which Mussolini’s hubris undoubtedly played 
no small part, ensured that the invasion was a debacle.  The Italian offensive almost 
immediately ground to a halt.  Of even greater concern to Germany, the British, in 
keeping with their prior guarantee of Greek independence, responded to the invasion 
by providing military assistance to Greece.60  The developing situation in Greece 
exposed Germany’s southern flank and posed an unacceptable threat to the invasion of 
the Soviet Union that Hitler planned for the following year.61  It thus became clear that 
Germany would have to intervene in Greece on Italy’s behalf.  Hitler informed the 
Italians that he would not be able to provide military relief until spring of 1941.  In the 
interim, he embarked upon a campaign of diplomacy in the region in order to smooth 
the way for the swift deployment of German troops into Greece and minimize any 
impact this diversion might have on his plans regarding the Soviet Union.62   
                                               
58 The attack on Greece was launched from Albania.  In pursuit of empire, Italy had already invaded 
Albania on April 7, 1939 and then vacillated in its view of either Yugoslavia or Greece as the next 
potential target of invasion within the Balkans.  Martin L. Van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy 1940-1941: 
The Balkan Clue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 7.           
59 Hitler unintentionally contributed to the timing of the invasion of Greece by not consulting with Italy 
on his decision to grant the request of Romania’s leader, Ion Antonescu, for German troops to be sent to 
Romania.  This resulted in a loss of face for Mussolini and also raised Italian concerns about Germany’s 
domination of the Balkans, a region that Italy considered to be within its sphere of interest.  In response 
to this “fait accompli,” Mussolini declared that Hitler “shall learn from the newspapers that I have 
occupied Greece.  Thus equilibrium shall be restored.”  Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, and 
Detlef Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, vol. 3, The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and 
North Africa 1939-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 408-409.  Though Hitler discouraged Italian 
designs on Yugoslavia, Creveld argues that, in early October, Hitler essentially gave Mussolini the 
“green light” to invade Greece.  According to Creveld, Hitler believed that Axis-occupied Greece 
would serve Germany’s strategic interests as a “bastion” within the eastern Mediterranean. Creveld, 
Hitler’s Strategy 1940-1941, 179-180.   
60 Schreiber, et al., Germany and the Second World War, 454. 
61 Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy 1940-1941, 181. 
62 Schreiber, et al., Germany and the Second World War, 456. 
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Hitler was increasingly concerned about Yugoslavia, which not only remained 
neutral and adamant in its refusal of the passage of German troops through Yugoslav 
territory, but was also being courted by the British and Americans.63  While Hitler 
endeavored to create a crescent of Axis-allied states as a secure land route to Greece, 
the British worked to persuade Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria to join together in a 
united Balkan front in order to resist further German intrusion into the region.64  
However, Yugoslavia entered into a nonaggression pact with Germany in early 
December.  At approximately this same time, Mussolini requested that Hitler pressure 
Yugoslavia to sign the Tripartite Pact in order to draw Greek troops to the Yugoslav 
border and away from the stalled Albanian front.  In turn, Nazi Foreign Minister 
Joachim von Ribbentrop instructed the German representative in Belgrade to inform 
the Yugoslavian government that the nonaggression pact was insufficient as a basis for 
the relationship with Yugoslavia that the Germans "envisaged.”65    
In order to aid the British in their effort to counter German overtures and stiffen 
the resolve of the Balkan states, the future head of the OSS, William Donovan, 
embarked upon a tour of the region in January 1941.66  His visit with the Yugoslav 
regent, Prince Paul, on January 23, 1941 initially appeared to have succeeded in 
                                               
63 Ibid., 459-461. 
64 Ibid., 457; J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, vol. 2, September 1939-June 1941 (London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1957), 374.     
65 Dragiša N. Ristić, Yugoslavia’s Revolution of 1941 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1966), 51. 
66 Tasovac, American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 80.  Even though the United States remained 
ostensibly neutral, President Roosevelt took a number of incremental steps to aid the beleaguered 
British both diplomatically and materially.  Donovan’s tour can thus be seen as one way in which the 
president sought to assist the British via “methods short of war.”  Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 420.   
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encouraging the formation of a regional alliance.67  The State Department 
representative in Belgrade, Arthur Bliss Lane, reported on January 25 that 
[Prince Paul] stated flatly Yugoslavia would refuse consent of the 
passage of German troops and would resist attack.  In reply to questions 
as to what his country would do if German troops entered Bulgaria he 
said, “It is most difficult.  I believe we will attack.  [Germany entry into 
Bulgaria] encircles us.  But my people are not all agreed.  The time has 
come to act on principle, to abandon expediency.”  He still felt that 
Germany did not wish trouble in the Balkans.  After discussion he said 
that the establishment of a Balkan line was necessary in order to finally 
defeat Germany.68 
 
The British Foreign Office (FO) also reported to the State Department that Turkey was  
engaged with Yugoslavia in discussions over “common action” and asked that the 
United States’ representatives in the respective countries “encourage the Yugoslav and 
Turkish Governments to follow up this initial effort.”69  Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull was noncommittal in his response to the British suggestion.70  He also informed 
Lane that it was not the policy of the Department of State “to initiate directly such a 
policy” as the establishment of a Balkan union in opposition to Nazi aggression.71   
Hull’s response to his minister and the British may seem odd considering the 
apparent purpose of Donovan’s visit to the Balkans at the president’s behest.  By all 
appearances, American foreign policy of noninterference in the Balkans had not 
changed.  However, while Hull provided a veneer of diplomatic propriety, others such 
                                               
67 Donovan was accompanied by a British military officer, Vivian Dykes, who recorded a daily 
summation of Donovan’s activities in his diary.  Alex Danchev, Establishing the Anglo-American 
Alliance: The Second World War Diaries of Vivian Dykes (New York: Brassey’s, 1990), 40-41. 
68 Lane to Hull, January 25, 1941, in Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 
[Henceforth FRUS], 1941: Volume II, Europe, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1959), 939, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1941v02.   
69 The British Embassy to the Department of State, February 4, 1941, FRUS, 1941: Volume II, Europe, 
940.   
70 “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State,” February 5, 1941, FRUS, 1941: Volume 
II, Europe, 941.   
71 Hull to Lane, January 19, 1941, FRUS, 1941: Volume II, Europe, 940.   
 24 
 
as Donovan and undersecretary of state Welles engaged in what were, according to 
diplomatic norms, more questionable activities.72  In addition to his meetings with the 
Yugoslav prime minister, foreign minister, and regent, Donovan met with the former 
Yugoslav chief of staff, General Dušan Simović, who was “all out to fight the 
Germans” and impressed Donovan “very favourably” according to Donovan’s British 
travel companion.73  One way in which Simović may have impressed Donovan is 
suggested by Donovan’s biographer, Richard Dunlop: 
Simović told Donovan that he believed concessions to Germany would  
be deadly and would destroy Yugoslavia’s chance to resist invasion.  
Certainly the Yugoslavs, tough mountain people with a knowledge of 
every pass and crag, would be able to make their rugged terrain an ally. 
Donovan and Simović talked over Simović’s plans for a coup d’état 
against the government of Prince Paul. The patriots would strike as 
soon as the government signed an agreement with the Axis and would 
place royal authority in the hands of 17-year-old King Peter, who 
agreed that Paul had outlived his usefulness.74 
 
Donovan met with other members of the Yugoslav military as well.  He also made 
promises of American material aid to Yugoslavia in a meeting with Yugoslav 
intelligence officers and asked them to make a list of their requests, despite the fact 
that he knew such a request would go unfulfilled.75 
Any positive effect that Donovan had appeared to have on the Yugoslav 
government proved to be illusory.  Hitler, concerned about reports of Yugoslav 
military mobilization, grew even less content with Yugoslavia’s neutrality and 
                                               
72 Tasovac, American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 57.  According to Sherwood, “the State 
Department was compelled by twenty years of isolationism to operate on the principle that the Alpha 
and Omega of American foreign policy is to keep out of war [emphasis in original].”  As such, its 
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74 Richard Dunlop, Donovan: America’s Master Spy (New York: Sky Horse Publishing, 2014), 259.   
75 Tasovac, American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 85. 
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increased pressure on the country to enter into the Tripartite Pact.76  Romania and 
Hungary had previously acceded to the alliance in November 1940.  Bulgaria became 
a signatory in early March 1941.77  With the exception of Greece, Yugoslavia was 
surrounded on all sides by members of the Axis alliance.  Yugoslavia’s geographic 
position and economic reliance upon Germany placed it in an unenviable position.78  
In a report to Secretary Hull on March 21, Lane described a meeting he had with 
Prince Paul in which Lane attempted to dissuade him from entering into an alliance 
with Germany, which now seemed imminent.  To Lane’s suggestion that continued 
neutrality would maintain Yugoslavia’s “diplomatic integrity” and “reputation 
abroad,” Prince Paul retorted that, “You big nations are hard, you talk of honor, but 
you are far away.”79  On March 25, Yugoslavia entered into the Tripartite Pact, though 
its membership in the Axis alliance was to be short-lived.  On March 27, the military 
carried out a coup d’état, placing King Peter II on the throne.80  General Simović, the 
architect of the coup, was promptly sworn in as prime minister.81  
Although Yugoslavia’s entrance into the Tripartite Pact was the occasion for the 
coup, Serbian dissatisfaction with the domestic policies of Prince Paul was one of its 
                                               
76 A German attaché in Belgrade reported troop mobilizations in Macedonia in March 1941.  Schreiber, 
et al., Germany and the Second World War, 472. 
77 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Hitler’s New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008), 11. 
78 Yugoslavia provided raw materials to Germany in exchange for industrial goods and became 
increasingly economically reliant upon Germany as the war progressed.  Schreiber, et al., Germany and 
the Second World War, 473.  Germany was especially reliant upon Yugoslavia for mineral resources.  
This was particularly true of aluminum, of which Yugoslavia provided approximately one third of 
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80 Pavlowitch, Hitler’s New Disorder, 12-13. 
81 For a detailed account of the coup as it occurred, as well as the role that Simović played in leading it 
and forming the subsequent government, see Ristić, Yugoslavia’s Revolution of 1941, 84-112. 
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primary underlying causes.82  Chief among these offending policies was the Sporazum, 
or agreement, reached between the government and Croatian political leaders in 1939.  
Since Yugoslavia’s creation there had been significant tension between the Croats and 
Serbs regarding the way in which their respective nationalities and territories would be 
incorporated into and governed within the newly formed country.  These tensions 
could erupt in violence, as they did when a Montenegrin member of the Serb Radical 
Party opened fire on and killed multiple Croat colleagues within the Yugoslav 
parliament in 1928.  In response, King Alexander abolished the parliament and 
established a dictatorship.83  He also reorganized Yugoslavia administratively and 
created provinces that “ignored… historical and ethnic” boundaries.84 
While Croats originally envisioned the establishment of an autonomous Croatian 
state within Yugoslavia, many Serbs believed that Croatia should simply be absorbed 
into the existing Serbian state and subordinated to its centralized rule.85  Prince Paul 
acquiesced to Croatian demands and approved the Sporazum, which created the 
Banovina, or province, of Croatia and granted it a significant degree of autonomy and 
signaled the return to traditional, ethnically-based administrative borders.  This 
agreement was met with resentment by many Serbs, who viewed it as a concession 
made at the expense of their deservedly dominant role within Yugoslavia and served 
to invigorate Serbian nationalism.86   
Besides serving as the galvanizing force behind the coup, this nationalism also  
                                               
82 Pavlowitch, Hitler’s New Disorder, 14. 
83 Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, 72-74. 
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revitalized the idea of a Greater Serbia.  According to this scheme, Yugoslavia would  
bring in those Serbs who currently resided outside of its borders and rid itself of 
minority populations via “population exchanges,” thus allowing the Serbs to reassert 
their hegemonic position within the state.87  This Pan-Serb ideology would come to 
have an understandably polarizing effect among Yugoslavia’s constituent ethnic 
groups.  It would also come to be associated with Mihailović and many of his most 
ardent supporters within the YGE and Serb-American community.          
The accessibility of the heroic Serbian image, and the positive view of its violent 
potential, among American journalists is apparent within their reports of the March 
coup and expectations regarding the subsequent invasion.  For instance, a New York 
Times’ headline on April 6, 1941 proclaimed the “Balkans Aflame.”  There was no 
trepidation about this conflagration.  Rather, it was hoped that it would ultimately 
consume the Nazi invaders.  The article went on to note that   
the Serbs are a singing race.  Many of their folksongs and war chants 
are centuries old.  Last week Serbian voices raised in the streets of 
Belgrade and many of the singers were marching men…. Southward, in 
a mountain fastness, the Yugoslavs were expected to make their stand, 
and rely on their national tradition of guerrilla fighting.  Such warfare, 
with its sudden forays on supply columns and on communications, 
might prove formidable, as in the World War, to the German military.88 
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This belief in the Serbs’ fighting spirit was soon put to the test, and the immediate 
results were not in keeping with the expectation of either the US government or press. 
Hitler, furious upon learning of the coup, ordered his military staff “to smash 
Yugoslavia militarily and as a state-form.”89  On April 6 the Nazis initiated the 
invasion of Yugoslavia with Operation ‘Retribution,’ during which the Luftwaffe 
mercilessly bombed the defenseless capital of Belgrade.90  The ensuing ground 
invasion was a rout.  On April 17, members of the Yugoslav military agreed to an 
unconditional surrender in the absence of King Peter and his cabinet, who had fled the 
country in the midst of the deteriorating military situation.91  Hitler quickly set about 
dismantling the “creation of the hated Versailles system” and partitioned the country 
among his allies.  In the words of historian Mark Mazower, Yugoslavia “was erased 
from the map.”92   
Two of the states that emerged from Hitler’s reconfiguration of Yugoslavia were 
the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and the residual state of Serbia.  The NDH 
was headed by Ante Pavelić.  Pavelić was the leader of the Ustaše, a fascist and 
separatist organization of Croat extremists that emerged following the establishment 
of the Yugoslav dictatorship and which directed the subsequent assassination of King 
Alexander in 1934.93  General Milan Nedić was appointed as president of the  
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collaborationist regime within the puppet state of Serbia.94 
Many within the United States were shocked by and sought to explain the speed 
with which the Yugoslav army was defeated.  Historian Ivo Tasovac assesses that the 
overestimation of Yugoslavia’s military capabilities stemmed in part from the 
“unusual faith… in the Serbian willingness to fight the Germans” expressed by those 
like the US military attaché in Yugoslavia.95  Before the campaign in Yugoslavia was 
even over, The New York Times reported that “hopes arose from American surveys 
such as that made by Colonel J. Donovan… that the Yugoslavs would fall back to 
their difficult mountain country, engage the Germans for a period, knock the Italians 
out of Albania and give Hitler his second great problem of the war.”  While the article 
concluded that the “Nazi air arm and ground machines upset this expectation,” others 
looked to a more insidious explanation for Yugoslavia’s humiliating performance.96  
According to some, the traitorous Croats were to blame.97  This signaled the 
emergence of an anti-Croat propaganda campaign that would become intertwined with 
the romantic narrative of Mihailović. 
 
ENTER MIHAILOVIĆ 
 
Following the invasion of Yugoslavia, the US government lost access to firsthand 
information about what was happening there.  The US minister, Lane, left the country 
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on May 17, 1941, and the consulate in Zagreb was closed in June.98  From mid-1941 
until the arrival of OSS in operatives in 1943, the US government was largely 
dependent upon sources such as the YGE, the Yugoslav émigré community within the 
United States, and the British government for information about the Yugoslav 
resistance forces and their activities. 
For their part, the British were initially no better positioned than the United States 
to determine, let alone influence, what was happening within occupied Yugoslavia.  
The British apparently underestimated the rapidity and totality with which Yugoslavia 
would be defeated.99  Historian Jørgen Hæstrop notes that the military collapse in 
Yugoslavia “came so suddenly that neither the SOE nor any other British authority 
managed to arrange for any contact in the country.  Not so much as a radio 
transmission set was left behind, and when later a new fumbling start was made, it had 
to be from scratch.”100  It was thus absent any British or American involvement that a 
general uprising began in early July, largely as a result of communist initiative.101 
Organized resistance to Axis occupation first emerged in Yugoslavia following 
the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.  This “fundamentally 
altered the situation in Yugoslavia,” according to historian Simon Trew, as it put into 
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play the two primary resistance groups, the Četniks under Mihailović and the Partisans 
under Tito.  Prior to the open revolt that the invasion of the Soviet Union ignited, both 
groups had avoided engaging either one another or the occupying forces.102  Although 
both leaders participated in the rebellion, the defeat of the Germans soon became a 
secondary concern for both Mihailović and Tito.  Both men quickly came to believe in 
the inevitability of Germany’s defeat and expulsion from Yugoslavia.103  This belief 
led them to instead focus on ensuring that their individual and mutually-exclusive 
visions of Yugoslavia would prevail in the war’s aftermath.  Tito, as the leader of the 
Communist Party in Yugoslavia, saw the conflict as an opportunity to achieve political 
revolution.  He also increasingly came to see Mihailović as a reactionary impediment 
to this goal.104  Mihailović, a colonel in the defeated Yugoslav army, refused to 
recognize capitulation and wanted to maintain “the persistence of the Yugoslav 
state.”105  At least some historians have concluded that his ultimate goal was “to create 
a greater Serbia” that was to be “based on traditionalist principles.”106  Regardless of 
whether or not he was an adherent of Pan-Serbism, Mihailović saw himself as a 
representative and defender of the traditional Yugoslavian order.  He thus quickly 
recognized Tito as the greatest threat to his vision of Yugoslavia’s postwar future.107 
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Although Mihailović’s Četniks initially joined the revolt in cooperation with 
Partisans, the “uncertain modus vivendi,” by which the two groups agreed to fight the 
Axis occupiers rather than one another, quickly collapsed.108  Mihailović felt pressured 
into action lest the uprising, and any territory liberated as a consequence of it, fall 
entirely under communist control.109  Considering that this was his primary motivation 
for entering the fray, it is unsurprising that it was difficult to maintain peace between 
the two groups.  Cooperation was also undermined by the Četniks’ and Partisans’ 
“differences in tactics and between the aims of their movements.”110  Tito was much 
more willing to engage the occupiers and accept any subsequent reprisals against the 
civilian populace than was Mihailović, who wanted to postpone decisive action until 
the arrival of the Allies.111  From Tito’s perspective, violence contributed to a 
breakdown of society that was conducive to revolution.112  As a result of these 
irreconcilable differences, the resistance activities of the Partisans and Chetniks soon 
devolved into internecine strife.   
As word of the uprising spread, the YGE, which had established itself in London 
after fleeing Yugoslavia, officially recognized Mihailović as the leader of the 
resistance forces and promoted him from colonel to general.113  Given the choice 
between recognizing and advocating for Allied support of either Mihailović or 
revolutionary communists, it is understandable that the YGE chose the former.  Also, 
despite British awareness of the Partisans’ participation in the fighting, the BBC 
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originally attributed the uprising to the leadership of Mihailović, contributing to the 
rise of the romantic narrative in which he and his Četniks were hailed as the exemplars 
of anti-Axis resistance.114  The US press quickly adopted this narrative as well. 
The pervasive belief in the Serbs’ fighting prowess was likely a contributing 
factor to the numerous reports of heroic feats that flourished following the recognition 
of Mihailović as the leader of the rebellion in Yugoslavia.  For example, Life 
magazine assured its readers on November 24, 1941 that Mihailović’s “army of Serb 
patriots today controls a quarter of Yugoslavia and most of the important railway 
lines.”115  Similarly, an article in the January 13, 1942, edition of the Chicago Daily 
Tribune announced that Mihailović, the “Serb ‘Robin Hood,’” was in “absolute 
control of over 20,000 square miles” as a result of his “brilliant undercover 
campaign.”116  By August 12, 1942, Yank claimed that Četnik control had expanded to 
two-thirds of the country, marking the opening of “a second front.”117  
There were other reasons than just Serbophilia that contributed to the seeming 
credulity with which these fantastical tales about Mihailović’s military successes were 
spread and consumed within the United States.  This romantic narrative was at least in 
part a result of the lack of firsthand American reporting from the region that held true 
for not only the US government, but also for the US press.  For example, Ray Brock of 
The New York Times, reported prolifically on Yugoslav affairs, but following the 
invasion he did so from Ankara.  Therefore, he relied upon secondhand sources, such 
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as a Serbian “eyewitness” and “the intelligence staffs of several powers,” to provide 
the information used in composing articles like the one of February 1, 1942, which 
claimed that the Četniks had turned Yugoslavia into “one vast battlefield.”118  Another 
factor that contributed to the dominance of this romantic narrative was that the initial 
outbreak of guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia represented one of the few instances of 
concerted effort on the part of a conquered people to violently resist absorption into 
Hitler’s expanding empire.  It would not be until 1943, following the German defeats 
at Stalingrad and El Alamein, that the aura of the Wehrmacht’s invincibility was 
diminished enough for a belief in the possibility of Germany’s ultimate defeat to 
emerge, with a concomitant spread of armed resistance to Nazi occupation throughout 
Europe.119  Thus, as the Germans launched what seemed to be yet another successful 
Blitzkrieg, this time against the Red Army, during summer of 1941, the news of the 
Yugoslav uprising provided a uniquely positive development within occupied Europe 
on which the US press might report.   
The Četnik successes against the Wehrmacht, a seemingly unstoppable juggernaut 
that had conquered much of continental Europe with alarming speed and disconcerting 
ease, undoubtedly seemed incredible.  According to Paul Fussell the “the Second 
World War was a notably secular affair,” marked more by “skepticism” than 
superstition.120  Though this would seem to preclude the preternatural heroism of the 
archetypal romance, it is hard to describe the above-mentioned exploits of Mihailović, 
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or their myriad other permutations as reported by the US press, as anything but 
miraculous.  They also bore little resemblance to the reality of the situation in 
Yugoslavia. 
The atrocities committed under Axis occupation served as ample proof of the 
nature of Mihailović’s enemies.  An example of what the Yugoslavs were 
experiencing is suggested by a message that King Peter sent to FDR in July 1942:  
General [Mihailović] reports on the crimes and massacres committed 
on the Serb population by Hungarians and Pavelić’s regime.  This 
report says that these crimes have now reached the point where city 
authorities of Belgrade have officially forbidden swimming in the Sava 
and Danube rivers, because their waters, flowing through the regions 
occupied by Hungary and Pavelić’s government have been 
contaminated by the massacred human bodies floating in their course.  
In Belgrade alone during the month of May 760 persons have been 
executed by the Germans without trial, explanation, or any apparent 
cause.121 
 
Notably, the victims of these and other atrocities were invariably identified as Serbian.  
The US press joined in spreading news of the Axis brutality toward the Serbs.  One of 
the numerous examples of this can be found in The New York Times report that 
“reliable sources in Yugoslavia tell a tale of ruthless savagery and horror.  In all parts 
of Yugoslavia that are inhabited by Serbs, Germans, Hungarians, and Bulgarians are 
said to be competing with each other in what reports declare are cold-blooded 
massacres aiming at extermination of the Serbian people.”122  The evil of Mihailović’s 
adversaries, as evidenced by their treatment of the Serbs, added a Manichaean dualism 
to the romantic narrative of Mihailović’s struggle.      
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Proponents of Greater Serbia attempted to use these atrocities to further their 
agenda. That Yugoslavs in general, and Serbs in particularly, suffered horribly under 
occupation is beyond question.  The war would leave 1.75 million Yugoslavs, or 
approximately 11 percent of the population, dead.123  Serbs suffered particularly harsh 
treatment at the hands of the Ustaše within the NDH, where it is estimated that 
between 300,000 to over 400,000 Serbs were killed.124  Rather than emphasizing the 
culpability of Pavelić and his followers for these atrocities, those seeking to reassert 
Serbian hegemony in postwar Yugoslavia instead blamed Croats as a whole.  Within 
the United States, the primary voice of anti-Croatian propaganda, as well as one of 
Mihailović’s most vociferous promoters, was Amerikanski Srbobran, the foreign-
language paper produced by the Serbian National Federation (SNF).125 
Pan-Serbism had an auspicious beginning within the United States, particularly  
in regard to anti-Croat sentiment.  Many members of the US press were ready to join 
the Pan-Serbs in painting the Croats as the traitors responsible for Yugoslavia’s defeat.  
There were “traitors under every rock” according to correspondent Cecil B. Brown’s 
account of his experience in Yugoslavia during the time of the German invasion.  
Besides having his vehicle stopped by a “Croat in Nazi uniform,” he also observed 
“Croat fifth columnists” aiding in the identification of “suspiciously loyal Serbs and 
Bosnians,” who were then “placed under guard.”  As Brown’s interview of a Serb 
military commander in the field made clear, the Croats had betrayed Yugoslavia. 
A tragic and majestic figure, General Nedelkovitch.  Three days before, 
this rotund, heavy-faced, mild-mannered, fifty-nine-year-old general 
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himself had been engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with the German 
invaders.  Two of his four staff officers had been killed in bayonet 
battles with the Nazis.  These men were Serbs, General Nedelkovitch 
had seen 40 per cent of his troops killed, and 50 per cent, all Croats, 
desert or refuse to answer the call to arms.126 
 
Even FDR seemed to be swept up in the Serbophile fervor.  According to the 
Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States, Konstantin Fotić, on December 20, 1941, 
Roosevelt responded to a memorandum that detailed Croat atrocities by assuring Fotić 
that “the Serbs will rise again as a great people.”  The President then went on to 
question “how, after such horrible crimes, [the Serbs] could expect to live in the future 
in the same state with the Croats.”127  Those that desired to see the creation of a 
postwar Greater Serbia were undoubtedly encouraged that the US press and 
government seemed to have adopted a sympathetic outlook on Yugoslav affairs.  
The narrative of Mihailović’s valiant battle against the forces of evil demanded 
that the United States assist him.  One of the many examples of this interpretation of 
America’s proper relationship to the Četniks can be seen in a message sent to FDR by 
his son, who was serving under Donovan in the newly created Office of the 
Coordinator of Information (COI), on November 24, 1941. 
In the hills of [Yugoslavia], Colonel [Mihailović], a modern Marion,  
and 30,000 Serbs, Croats, and Greeks are fighting the Axis.  They have  
wirelessed a desperate appeal for help to you and Mr. Churchill.  The 
world is just becoming aware of this battle still raging in the interior of 
Europe.  The struggle of the Serb guerrillas is as dramatic as the World 
War I fight of the Armenians against the Turks….  To aid these people, 
to let them know they have made contact with the outside world, to 
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show them their pleas have not fallen on deaf ears, we propose to send 
a bomber load of medical supplies….128 
 
As evidenced by the above message, the romantic narrative of Četnik resistance 
resonated on an emotional level with at least some officials in the US government.  
  
CONCLUSION 
 
The romantic narrative initially garnered significant American sympathy for the 
Serbs suffering within Yugoslavia and support for the Četnik cause.  However, this 
sympathy and support was based upon a superficial understanding of Yugoslavia.  
Misinformation and preconceived notions about the Balkans and its inhabitants 
contributed to this understanding.  This unsound foundation would not be able to bear 
the weight of the romantic narrative over time.  The image of the Balkans was 
malleable, and as word of the conflict between the Četniks and the Partisans began to 
filter into the Western press, Americans would prove more than able and willing to 
abandon their positive view of Balkan volatility and violence.  Also, the reach of 
Serbophilia within the United States had its limits, as would be discovered by the 
proponents of the Pan-Serb ideology.   
Nonetheless, through 1941 and much of 1942, Mihailović was lauded as a hero by 
the American press and government officials.  Unfortunately for him, US support was 
limited primarily to pledges of future aid.  The near-term reason for this was a 
problem of logistics.  This is indicated by a meeting that King Peter had with Donovan 
in the United States in November 1942. According to the king’s memoir, he was 
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assured that aid for Mihailović “would be forthcoming as soon there were enough 
long-range bomber in the Middle East to permit it.”129  There is no reason to doubt the 
sincerity of this assurance, as the United States did increase its material support to 
Yugoslavia considerably in the coming years.  However, by that time the romantic 
narrative had, for many Americans, run its course. 
                                               
129 Peter II, King of Yugoslavia, A King’s Heritage (New York: Van Rees Press, 1954), 145. 
 40 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
MIHAILOVIĆ: THE REACTIONARY AND RACIST COLLABORATOR 
 
In 1944, the military intelligence staff of the Allied Force Headquarters in the 
Mediterranean Theatre published a confidential report detailing the activities of the 
Četniks that presented Mihailović in a far less flattering light than did the earlier 
romantic narrative.  It focused on the ways in which Mihailović “placed in the 
forefront of his policy not the expulsion of the enemy invaders but the suppression of a 
group of his countrymen to whose aims he was inexorably opposed, and whom he 
regarded as his most serious rivals for power after the collapse of the Germans which 
he thought ultimately inevitable.”  His view of the Partisans as his principal enemy led 
Mihailović to adopt “various measures of collaboration with the Axis which [had] 
been a serious factor in causing the Allies to withdraw support” from him.130   
In addition to accusing Mihailović of collaboration, the military also concluded 
that the Četniks were Pan-Serb.  The handbook went on to describe the group of 
“political figures” with “violently chauvinistic convictions” who attached themselves 
to the Četniks.  As a consequence of these political figures’ influence, 
the intense Serb nationalism which animated this group caused them to 
ascribe the military collapse of Yugoslavia… to Croat treachery and a 
myth of “stab in the back” was carefully fostered in a way similar to 
that which flourished in similar psychological conditions in post-1918 
Germany…  To this anti-Croat and Great-Serb trend was allied the 
hostility of [Mihailović] and the officer class towards Communism, 
coupled with the profession of undying loyalty to the King….  Of the 
                                               
130 G-2, Allied Force Headquarters, The Četniks: A Survey of Četnik Activity in Yugoslavia, April 
1941—July 1944 (Printing and Stationary Services CMF, September, 1944), 11-12. 
 41 
 
violent Great-Serb nature of Mihailović’s early policy and propaganda 
there is ample evidence.131 
 
While the handbook acknowledged that Mihailović was able to achieve a degree of 
unity across ethnic boundaries by appealing to anti-communist sentiments among 
conservative Yugoslavs, it argued that Mihailović’s efforts to overcome the alienation 
that resulted from the Četnik’s association with Pan-Serbism proved to be too little, 
too late.132       
The military’s findings on the Četnik resistance had parallels within the United 
States and were preceded by a discourse among American civilians and government 
officials about the nature of Mihailović’s movement and what it meant for the future 
of Yugoslavia.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, Krapfl described romance as “a 
quest, a heroic struggle between good and evil.”133  Mihailović enjoyed nearly 
universal support within the US when Americans understood the Četniks as being 
engaged in a generic struggle of good versus evil.  In this chapter I discuss how many 
liberal cultural producers increasingly came to view the YGE and Mihailović as 
reactionary, dictatorial, and Pan-Serb.134  None of these characteristics aligned with 
the liberal belief that the war was a “democratic revolution” based upon the principles 
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of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms.135  FDR introduced the Four Freedoms 
during his annual message to Congress in 1941.  In this message, he explained that his 
policies were meant to safeguard what he described as the “four essential human 
freedoms.”  These consisted of “freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from 
want and from fear.”136  The Atlantic Charter was agreed upon by FDR and Churchill 
in August 1941.  Among the commitments of this agreement was the pledge “that the 
postwar order would respect the self-determination of nations.”137  The Four Freedoms 
and the Atlantic Charter provided that ideological underpinnings of the US war effort.  
As historian Frank A. Warren notes,   
From [FDR’s] Four Freedoms speech… to the editorials in PM, The 
Nation, The New Republic, Common Sense, and The Free World… 
liberal ideology, liberal rhetoric, and liberal assumptions permeated 
discussion of war.  “Democracy,” “freedom,” the “common man,” the 
“people,” and the “people’s revolution” were the words and phrases 
which… did things in defining the meaning and purpose of World War 
II.138 
 
The divergence of the perceived aims of the Četnik movement from liberal ideals, 
combined with the accusation of collaboration, all served to erode the romantic 
narrative of Mihailović’s resistance.  Those that either contributed to or were 
persuaded by this reassessment of Mihailović’s “quest,” both in regard to its ends and 
means, called for the US to look elsewhere for a co-protagonist in its war against 
fascism.  
In this chapter, I also describe the ways in which Pan-Serbism came into  
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conflict with the US government’s attempts to promulgate a message of unity.  This  
message was continually reiterated by both the government and press and fit the mold 
of what White termed the comedic narrative.  According to him, the comedy results in 
a “reconciliation of men with men, of men with their world and society… [and] 
seemingly inalterably opposed elements… are revealed to be… harmonizable with one 
another, unified, at one with themselves and the others.”139  Mihailović, the YGE, and 
the Yugoslav-American community were components of a larger metanarrative of 
global unity.  This narrative called upon Yugoslav-Americans to unite with one 
another and US society as a whole, for the resistance forces in Yugoslavia to fight 
together, and for the YGE to overcome its internal political differences.  This 
metanarrative was given form in the United Nations, which would win the war and 
ensure peace, stability, and American security in its aftermath.140  Tito, rather than 
Mihailović, came to be seen by many as the likelier candidate to ensure Yugoslavian 
unity and postwar peace. 
 
THE PROBLEMS WITH PAN-SERBISM 
 
Throughout the war, Pan-Serb proponents within the Serb-American community 
attacked the Croats as a whole and attempted to link Croat-Americans to fascism and 
Pavelić’s regime, often while simultaneously advocating for US support of 
Mihailović.  An example of this can be seen in a letter sent to the State Department by  
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the leadership of a Serbian Eastern Orthodox parish in Steelton, Pennsylvania:  
We Americans of Serbian descent… direct this protest… against the 
so-called “Croatian Congress” which is to be held in Chicago, 
Illinois… BECAUSE it is a Congress called by those whose nearest kin 
have declared war against the United States… That it might be called 
‘Pavelich’s’ Congress can be seen by this, that [its] president…  was 
[accused of being] a Pro-Nazi. 
 
The letter proceeded to express gratitude for the “aid given to General [Draža 
Mihailović] and his Serbian [Četniks], who in fact are keeping open the Second Front 
in Europe… [and] pinning down thirty of Hitler’s divisions in the Balkans.”141  
Besides being encouraged by the pro-Serb sentiments expressed by members of the 
press and government, the Serb-Americans that made such accusations might have 
reasonably expected that domestic anxieties about disloyal citizens with foreign ties 
had produced an environment that was conducive to the propagation and acceptance of 
their message.  In their eagerness to exploit America’s wartime nativism, they 
apparently failed to appreciate that they wielded a double-edged sword.  
Although the United States appeared to be working itself into a nativist lather 
over the threat posed by fifth columnists prior to its formal entrance into the war as a 
belligerent, these fears would largely be channeled toward combatting foreign 
influence and social discord.  In 1940, the ubiquitous William Donovan co-authored a 
pamphlet, Fifth Column Lessons for America, published by the American Council on 
Public Affairs.  In it, he made clear that Hitler’s military success would not have been 
possible without the help of “Germans abroad and sympathizers in victim 
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countries.”142  Unfortunately, the tolerance of democratic societies like the United 
States allowed fifth columnists to “function most freely and effectively.”143  This 
permissiveness allowed for them to spread divisive propaganda.  “Hitler’s final 
weapon in this country would be… the creation of revolution” Donovan warned and 
quoted Hitler’s plan to “produce unrest and revolts in the United States.”144  Members 
of the press also lamented that the US government had been too lenient in allowing 
fifth columnists to operate, as can be seen in a Saturday Evening Post editorial from 
August 3, 1940, that proposed “in common sense there are only a few words to be said 
about the Fifth Column… Every political organization subject to foreign influence 
should be outlawed.  Any American citizen belonging to one… should be charged 
with treason.”145 
One factor that likely helped to mitigate nativist backlash toward Croats in the 
United States was the memory of the regrettable treatment of German-Americans 
during the First World War.  As State Department official Harry B. Hoskins wrote in 
1942,  
most of us will remember the unfortunate experience of World War I, 
when there was in many sections of the country an almost automatic 
tendency to classify as pro-German all who had German names or were 
of German descent.  This bigoted assumption led to a kind of witch-
hunting which did serious damage to our national unity… Yet it is a 
matter of record that, with a very small number of exceptions, our 
German and other foreign-born citizens during the last war were as  
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loyal and useful to the United States as any other citizen group.146 
 
Possibly with this past manifestation of American nativism in mind, some members of 
the press rushed to the defense of the Croats even as others vilified them.  For 
instance, in an April 1941 issue of The New Republic, M. W. Fodor informed his 
readers that “we have often read that the Croats are pro-Nazi.  Fundamentally this is 
not true, since the Croat is just as liberty-loving and jealous of his independence as is 
the Serb.”147  
Some Croat-Americans defended their Yugoslav kin as the victims of Serbian 
misrule.  Immediately following the invasion of Yugoslavia, the Chicago Daily 
Tribune provided insight into the “Croatian point of view” regarding the establishment 
of the NDH in light of the historical treatment of Croats in Yugoslavia.  According to 
a letter to the editor from a presumably Croat contributor, between “1918 and 1939,” 
the Yugoslav government had forced “the Croatians into submission by acts of 
brutality and savagery.”  Because of these injustices, Pavelić was to be considered no 
more of a “terrorist” than was “George Washington.”  While the defense of Pavelić 
was not a position that met with widespread American sympathy, the argument that 
traditional Yugoslav rule was unfair to non-Serbs and needed to be revised would 
be.148 
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There was also a tendency among liberal cultural producers within the United 
States to link racism to Nazism.  This can be seen in an article that appeared in the 
Autumn 1943 issue of Common Ground, which was co-authored by John Collier, the 
US Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and Saul Padover, Assistant to the Secretary of 
the Interior.  The article explained that Hitler had started a global “race war” with the 
result that “everywhere race prejudice is endemic.”  The authors expressed their 
believe that “race and ‘minority’ questions” had the potential to “wreck our 
democracy” if left unresolved.  The solution to this threat was overcoming race 
“prejudice” and “arrogance” and the “establishment of a genuine equality for all 
peoples… [without which] there [could] be no lasting peace in the world.”  The ideal 
course of action was to be modeled on the Soviet Union, which had “solved its racial 
and ethnic problems wisely—by preaching and practicing genuine equality of 
opportunity for all its citizens, regardless of their color or racial origin.”149  As will be 
seen, Pan-Serbism came to be compared to Nazi race “prejudice” and “arrogance.”  In 
contrast, the ethnic heterogeneity of the Partisan movement came to be portrayed in 
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the same way that Collier and Padover favorably described the Soviet solution to race 
problems.  
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the State Department expressed 
concern about not just the foreign influence exerted by the enemies of the United 
States, but foreign influence in general.  On December 10, 1941, within days of the 
government’s designation of Japanese, Italian, and German citizens in the United 
States as enemy aliens, the State Department issued a policy statement regarding 
political activities of “free movements.”150  The State Department recognized that “the 
United States is composed of citizens from many national backgrounds” and allowed 
that they might have “a natural interest in their country of origin.”  Regardless of such 
inclinations, it declared that “United States citizens of whatever background owe, and 
have, an undivided allegiance to the United States.”  It then went on to state that “the 
first concern of the United States must always be the unity of the country,” and that 
US government would look with disfavor on “any attempt to enlist the support of 
American citizens of like racial background on the theory that they are ‘fellow 
nationals.’”151   
The threat that discord among Yugoslav-Americans posed to domestic unity was 
of serious concern to the US government, and the proponents of Greater Serbia were 
quickly identified as the ones who were primarily responsible for inflaming the 
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dispute.152  According to a report provided by British intelligence to the Foreign 
Nationalities Branch (FNB) of the OSS in December, 1941, “the chief danger to 
Yugoslav unity [in the United States]… comes from the Serbian National Federation 
[SNF] with its dangerous press and campaign of anti-Croat, non-Yugoslav, pro-Serb 
tendency.”153  A State Department report from May 27, 1942 drew similar 
conclusions.  It found that Amerikanski Srbobran, “the official organ of the Serb 
National Federation and the most influential Serb-language daily in the United States, 
opened the anti-Croat campaign” in early November.  As a part of this campaign, the 
paper ran a front-page “account of the suppression of the Serbs… and accused the 
Croats as a whole of being [pro-Pavelić].  The indignant reply of the American Croats 
was to ask why the [Srbobran] omitted criticism of [Nedić], the Serbian counterpart of 
[Pavelić].”  The State Department surmised that the purpose of SNF’s attack was to 
discredit “the idea of Yugoslavia itself, thus paving the way for a ‘Greater Serbia.’”154  
The same report also concluded that some of the most egregious perpetuators of anti-
Croat hostilities included two individuals linked to the YGE: Archbishop Dionisije 
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Milivojević, head of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church in North America, and the 
YGE’s chief diplomatic representative in the United States, Minister Constantin 
Fotić.155  
There were several other domestic factors that contributed to the government’s 
particular concern over the ways in which Serb nationalism was being expressed 
within America and undermining the narrative of national unity.  One of these was the 
large numbers of Yugoslav-Americans employed “in heavy industries in the East and 
Middle West,” and thus the possibility that discord within this community might 
adversely affect war production.156  Another factor was that Americans of Croat and 
Slovene descent significantly outnumbered the Serbs.  According to a 1944 estimate, 
there were a total of one million first, second, and third generation Yugoslav- 
Americans.  Of these, approximately 500,000 were Croats, 300,000 were Slovenes, 
and 200,000 were Serbs.157  This meant that the majority of Yugoslav-Americans were 
understandably hostile to the idea of Greater Serbia and anti-Croat propaganda.  This 
had potential implications for electoral politics if the majority of Yugoslav-Americans 
sensed that government policy favored the Serbs.158  This was of particular concern in 
light of reports like the one sent by the COI to the State Department on May 27, 1942, 
that the apparent latitude granted to Fotić and Dionsije within the US had led many 
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Serbs and Croats to assume “that the movement against a confederated Yugoslavia 
and for a Greater Serbia had at least the tacit approval of the United States 
Government.”159  
The issue of demographics was brought up in a meeting between Assistant 
Secretary of State Adolph Berle and Fotić on June 12, 1942, during which Berle tried 
to bring Fotić to heel.  According to Berle, he expressed to Fotić that the government 
was “disturbed by the recrudescence of the Great Serbian Movement in the United 
States.”  He pointed out to Fotić that the “majority of Yugoslav subjects in the United 
States… were not Serbs,” but Croats, and that it was his “distinct impression” that “the 
great majority” of them did not support Pavelić.  Berle also revealed that he was aware 
that Fotić had “interested himself” in the “Serb-Croat controversy” and expressed his 
hope that Fotić “would exert his influence” in “reducing” these tensions.160  If he 
hoped that this meeting would either alter Fotić’s behavior or quell the Croat-Serb 
dispute, Berle was to be sadly disappointed. 
In September, 1942, Elmer Davis, the director of the Office of War Information 
(OWI), invited Berle to a meeting of the editors of the major Yugoslav foreign 
language papers in order to cajole them into assisting with the restoration of harmony 
in the Yugoslav-American community.  According to Berle’s account of the meeting, 
the Serbs were “still making trouble for the Croats—probably with some help from” 
Fotić.  Berle told the attendees that it would be “a complete perversion of [US] policy” 
to view the recent decision to upgrade the status of the Yugoslav legation to that of 
embassy “as a personal tribute to the” Pan-Serbs or Fotić.  He also made clear that the 
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US “had no interest in the politics of General [Mihailović], so long as he was fighting 
the Germans… This had nothing whatever to do with his political views or possible 
later aspirations.”161  This would not be the only instance in which government 
officials distanced themselves from Mihailović’s political objectives. 
If FDR had somehow remained unaware of the potential for public backlash in 
response to the perception of governmental endorsement of Pan-Serbism, this was 
remedied shortly after a speech he delivered on September 3, 1942.  During this 
address, he made reference to the “fighting spirit” and “unconquerable peoples” of a 
number of occupied countries, to include “Serbia.”162  The New York Times reported 
on September 12, that the President had been told “some concern had arisen… that he 
no longer recognized Yugoslavia.”  The incident was explained away as “a slip… due 
to the fact that in former days [the President] used to see the name Serbia so much on 
the stamps he collected.”163   
FDR’s faux pax caused an immediate international and domestic stir.   The Vice 
Prime Minister of the YGE informed US Minister Biddle about the great esteem in 
which the Croats held the United States, their knowledge of what happened there, and 
how regretful it was that the President had failed to acknowledge their resistance.164  
According to the Washington, D.C. newspaper The Evening Star, Louis Adamic, 
“noted American author of Yugoslav birth,” sent a message to the White House,  
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informing them 
that the President’s saying “Serbia” disposes of Yugoslavia as a state, 
and that has caused an uproar among Yugoslavs and Yugoslav-
Americans, whose number exceed 1,000,000, 90 per cent of whom are 
of Croatian and Slovenian origin.  The matter involves the morale of 
hundreds of thousands of people (Croat-Americans) working in our war 
plants. 
 
As evidence of the way in which Serb chauvinists might exploit the slip, the 
article recounted that, while speaking at a luncheon, Ruth Mitchell claimed “that the 
end of Yugoslavia has been conceded by the highest authorities.”  The article went on 
to explain the nature of the Pan-Serb ideology and the Croat-Serb dispute.  It described 
the aim of “the Pan-Serb movement” as the creation of “post-war Serbian domination 
over the other nationality groups” in Yugoslavia.  It also informed its readers that the 
State Department, OWI, and the OSS 
have all sought to discourage the men who are active in the attempt to 
arrange that Serbs shall be supreme in Yugoslavia over the Croats and 
Slovenes after Axis withdrawal.  Officially, this is regarded as a denial 
of the thesis of the Atlantic Charter, which implies equality of 
nationality groups.165 
 
Despite official claims that the United States was uninterested in Mihailović’s 
politics, the government kept informed about them throughout the war, and there was 
substantial reason to believe that the Četniks were a reactionary force that fought for 
the creation of a postwar Greater Serbia.  In September, 1942, the British Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS) provided the OSS with an assessment of the situation in 
Yugoslavia, to include the political character of Mihailović’s resistance movement.  
According to the report, Mihailović was “primarily concerned with Serbia and the 
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Serbs.”  He also regarded the Partisans as “the most dangerous enemy of his ideal of 
‘Srpstvo,’” a term that, according to Adis Maksić, “roughly signifies a quality of being 
a Serb, and is often translated as ‘Serbdom’ or ‘Serbianism.’”166  SIS believed that 
Mihailović’s overall policy was “to destroy these internal enemies and to build up an 
organization that will be in a position to establish an authoritarian Pan-Serb regime 
(under King Peter II).”167  An OSS report from November 26, 1942, that was based 
upon information provided by “Russian sources” confirmed these findings, noting that 
while Mihailović was “non-political,” he had “the reputation of a chauvinist with 
‘Great-Serb’ ideals and a distrust, if not hatred, for the Croats.”168  Similar concerns 
were reported by Anthony Biddle, the US ambassador to the YGE.  In a message to 
the Secretary of State in January, 1943, Biddle reported on the belief among the Croat, 
Slovene, and Serb-Democrat members of the YGE that Mihailović had been instructed 
“to pursue the Pan-Serb line of policy” within Yugoslavia.169 
Pan-Serbs were identified as chronic spoilers of unity within the YGE and were 
blamed for its failure to adopt of a “liberal forward-looking policy.”  Mihailović was 
seen as a party to this dispute due to his suspected adherence to Pan-Serbism and 
appointment as Minister of War.  Biddle actively encouraged the YGE to declare “a 
post-war policy envisaging equal economic, social, and political opportunities for all.”  
Although such a policy was supported by Serb Democrat, Croat, and Slovene 
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members of the YGE, it was opposed by “Serb Extremists.”170  For example, Biddle 
reported on December 5, 1942, that while the development of a “forward-looking 
policy” was being discussed at a recent YGE cabinet meeting, the Radical Serb Party 
member and Minister of Education, Miloš Trifunović, “urged the formation of a 
purely Serbian front, limited to Serbs from Serbia.”  In response, a Croat member of 
the cabinet “emphasized his earnest hopes for the reestablishment of Yugoslavia along 
democratic lines: a federated state under the King, wherein all would enjoy equal 
rights politically, economically and spiritually.”  Biddle noted that the “scheme” to 
increase the postwar strength of the Serbs vis-à-vis the Croats by including Bosnia 
within Serbia was supported by Mihailović, whose involvement presaged “a vigorous 
debate before [the US] may expect this question to be ironed out.”171   
On December 20, 1942, Secretary of State Hull wrote to Biddle that he was to 
continue his “informal efforts” at “bringing about a better understanding” among the 
factions within the YGE.  He also made the point that “aspects” of the “Yugoslav 
question” were of “direct concern to a considerable element of the American people” 
and that Serb-Croat dispute was having “a deplorable effect on” the United States’ 
“national unity.”  Although he recognized that Fotić bore “a considerable degree of” 
responsibility for this discord “through his apparent support of the Pan-Serb element,” 
he nevertheless thought that it was best that he remain as the YGE’s representative 
within the United States.  He expressed regret that the Mihailović-Partisan controversy 
had “gained some prominence in the American press,” but insisted that the US 
government maintained “full confidence” in Mihailović, as “statements about to be 
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made” would make clear.  In Hull’s opinion, “the most effective” charge against 
Mihailović was that he had “lost respect for his own Government’s belief in Yugoslav 
unity.”172 
 
MIHAILOVIĆ ACCUSED 
 
If viewed in isolation, the message that Secretary of Hull recommended be sent 
by General Dwight D. Eisenhower to Mihailović on the eve of 1943 suggested that the 
romantic narrative about the Četnik leader continued unabated. 
General Draža Mihailovich… the American forces in Europe and 
Africa send greetings to their comrades in arms the resourceful and 
gallant Yugoslav military units under your splendid leadership.  These 
brave men banded together on their native soil to drive the invaders 
from their country are serving with full devotion the cause of the 
United Nations.  May the New Year bring them full success.173 
 
However, Time drew attention to the fact that the contents of the message were not 
released by Eisenhower’s headquarters, but instead by the YGE.  This was seen as a 
possible sign that the US government did not know “enough about the complexities” 
of the Yugoslav conflict “to justify a clean-cut commitment.”174  The YGE released 
the message to the press on January 11, 1943.  According to The New York Times, “a 
spokesman said that the message was definite evidence that the United Nations were 
backing General [Mihailović] and threw down various recent attempts to discredit him 
and his efforts.”175  Central to these “attempts to discredit” Mihailović was the 
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suggestion that one of the ways in which his “gallant” forces had been “resourceful” 
was by collaborating with the Axis occupiers. 
The initial accusation of Mihailović’s collaboration followed shortly after the  
Germans launched their summer offensive against the Red Army on June 28, 1942.176  
In anticipation of this offensive, the Soviet foreign minister traveled to London a few 
weeks prior in order to encourage the opening of a second front on continental Europe.  
Churchill explained that, for the moment, this was impossible.177  The Soviets had 
borne the brunt of German hostilities for the past year and it looked as if 1942 would 
be no different.  On July 28, a communist newspaper in New York, The Daily Worker, 
ran an article repeating the claims of Radio Free Yugoslavia that Mihailović was “a 
Fascist and a traitor.”178  Radio Free Yugoslavia was based in the Soviet Union and 
Walter Roberts argues that it could not broadcast such claims “without the consent of 
the Soviet authorities.”179  This marked a sharp break with earlier Soviet policy, when 
the Comintern had dismissed Tito’s complaints of Četnik collaboration and 
encouraged him “to achieve a true united national front” against the Axis occupiers.180  
In light of the failure of the Soviet Union’s Western allies to provide satisfactory 
succor, the Soviets most likely decided to encourage fighting where it existed.181 
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In August 1942, Fotić presented Welles with a series of telegrams from  
Mihailović in which the general explained his actions in Yugoslavia.  According to 
Mihailović’s messages, he could not “give a serious blow” without adequate “arms 
and supplies.”  He also stated that he was instructed by the British to prevent “a 
Communist uprising for Soviet Russia,” that “the Communists are hated by the 
people,” and that “the people have been provoked by the incredible terror of the 
Communists who had killed thousands of Nationalists.”182  This was undoubtedly a 
move to counter the accusations in The Daily Worker, which Fotić also addressed.  He 
complained that “this article had immediately been republished in the [communist-
inclined] portions of the Croatian press in the United States.”183  Considering the 
demonization that the Croats experienced following the invasion of Yugoslavia, it is 
not surprising that they seized upon the opportunity to slander the Pan-Serbs’ hero. 
While the mainstream press was not initially receptive to the communists’ 
accusations, its defense of Mihailović grew muddled over a very short period of time.  
Through October, 1942, The New York Times dutifully reported the YGE’s “utmost 
confidence” in Mihailović and described the Partisans as a group of “criminals, 
renegades, bandits, and dissident Croats and Moslems.”184  By November 20, The New 
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York Times conceded that although the accusation of “‘traffic’ with the enemy” had 
gained “some verisimilitude,” Mihailović’s “defenders” explained that contact with 
Italians and Nedić was necessary in order to obtain supplies.  In addition, Nedić was 
“after all… a Serb and… no Quisling.”185  This was a distinction that few, if any, 
within the American government or press had made in the past or would make in the 
future.  The Nation assured its readers on November 28, 1942, that although the 
rebuttals to the accusations made in The Daily Worker revealed that a “considerable 
civil war” was underway in Yugoslavia, the “charge that [Mihailović acted] in 
calculated collusion with [Nedić], the Serbian Quisling, [was] certainly unfounded.”  
Instead, Mihailović and Nedić had “made simultaneous, though wholly separate, 
moves against the partisans.”186   
The trajectory of American reporting on Mihailović conflicted with the YGE’s 
portrayal, which continued to present the Četnik resistance in absolute terms.  A 
memorandum that the YGE sent to the State Department in December insisted that  
Mihailović’s “activities… [had] not ceased for a moment” and that “allegations… that 
he [was] indirectly cooperating with the Axis” were false.187  One reason that the YGE 
possibly felt compelled to continue presenting Mihailović in this manner is suggested 
by Paul Fussell’s observation about wartime categorizations:  
If war is a political, social, and psychological disaster, it is also a  
perceptual and rhetorical scandal from which total recovery is unlikely.  
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Looking out upon the wartime world, soldiers and civilians alike reduce 
it to a simplified sketch featuring a limited series of classifications into 
which people, in the process dehumanized and deprived of 
individuality or eccentricity, are fitted.188  
 
While the British were aware of Mihailović dealings with the Italians, and 
distinguished his behavior from “true” collaboration, the YGE was undoubtedly 
concerned that neither the American nor Yugoslav public would appreciate this 
distinction.189 
Moscow was also sensitive to the problem of categorization as it related to Tito’s 
Partisans.  In a series of messages in early 1942, the Comintern reprimanded Tito for 
allowing the Partisans to “acquire a Communist character” and instructed him not to 
“view the issues of [his] fight only from [his] own national standpoint, but also from 
the international standpoint of the American-British-Soviet coalition” and to 
demonstrate “political elasticity.”190  In November, 1942, the Comintern gave Tito 
permission to form “a national liberation committee of Yugoslavia… with an all-
national Yugoslav and all-party antifascist character” with the caveats that Tito would 
refrain from putting “it in opposition to the” YGE or “raise the question” of abolishing 
the monarchy.  Thus, with Moscow’s blessing, Tito formed the Anti-Fascist Council 
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of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Bihać in November 1942.191  
This would subsequently be hailed by many as evidence of the Partisans’ democratic 
character.       
Possibly spurred to a higher standard of journalistic integrity by the British 
decision to begin mentioning the Partisans in its propaganda broadcasts, the December 
14, 1942, issue of Time magazine declared that Mihailović had been “eclipsed” by the 
Partisans.192  According to the article, Americans had been so “misled by previous 
reports” about Mihailović that “many a Time reader nominated [Mihailović] for Man 
of the Year.”  Time revealed that, in fact, the Četniks had been militarily inactive, and 
that those who wanted “to continue active resistance” had deserted to the Partisans.  
The “impoverished peasants” of all nationalities within Yugoslavia showed “an 
increasing preference for the Partisans” over Mihailović, who fought “for a greater 
Serbia.”  In contrast to Mihailović, the Partisans had adopted “democratic methods 
almost unprecedented in the Balkans.”  Proof that the Partisans were neither 
“Communist” nor “bandit” could be seen in the political heterogeneity and 
respectability of the “National Constitutional Assembly” that had been formed in the 
Partisan “capital” of Bihać.193 
Within days of the Time’s article, The Saturday Evening Post ran Adamic’s  
“Mikhailovitch: Balkan Mystery Man,” which was also critical of Mihailović and the 
Četniks.  According to Adamic, Mihailović’s “dilemma” was whether to choose to be 
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on the side of “democracy" and “revolutionary Communism” or on the side of 
“Fascism.”  Unfortunately, “orders from the” YGE led Mihailović “necessarily closer 
to the Quisling apparatus” than to the Partisans.  While Adamic allowed that “some 
people” in Yugoslavia were “anti-Partisan,” he claimed that the “majority” were not.  
However, he did express some apprehension about the Partisan’s revolutionary nature, 
reminding his readers of “the death of hundreds of thousands of people” as a result of 
Communist revolution in China.194  He closed by asking what the situation in 
Yugoslavia meant for the fate of democracy.195  As the Partisan-Četnik struggle 
continued, Adamic and other liberal and left-leaning writers would direct increasingly 
harsh criticism toward Mihailović and be far more reserved in bringing scrutiny to 
bear on the Partisans.  Rather than signaling a complete narrative volte-face, these 
criticisms instead meant that the romantic narrative of Mihailović was now contested, 
and that reporting on Yugoslavia would no longer consist solely of hagiographical 
about Mihailović. 
Perhaps none of Mihailović’s American supporters refused to go gentle into that 
good night more so than reporter Ruth Mitchell.  Besides being the sister of General 
Billy Mitchell, she gained a measure of fame in her own right by joining the Četniks 
while on assignment in the Balkans.  She then promptly fell into the hands of the 
Gestapo.  After a year in prison, Mitchell was released by the Germans and returned to  
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the United States, where she advocated tirelessly on behalf of the Četniks.196 
Mitchell’s refutation of the accusations against Mihailović served as a precursor 
to the early historiographical focus on communist conspiracy as discussed in the 
introduction.  As Krapfl notes, “romance can attribute failure only to a diabolical 
antagonist.”197  In the case of Mihailović, his diabolical antagonists were the 
communists, as Mitchell made clear in “General Mihailovich: The Story of a Frame-
Up,” in the July, 1943 issue of The American Mercury.  In it, Mitchell traced the 
accusations of collaboration to the communist publications The Daily Worker and New 
Masses, from where their “echoes” filtered into the mainstream press.  Of the 
“communists and their collaborators” that were running “wild… in inflating the 
performance of the ‘Partisans’ and in smearing” Mihailović, Ruth singled out the 
influence of Louis Adamic as particularly pernicious. According to Mitchell, Adamic 
wielded undue influence upon the OWI, spread “communist propaganda,” and was 
“widely regarded as a Serb hater.”198  For his part, Adamic accused Mitchell of being 
on the payroll of the YGE.199 
Mitchell was right to be concerned that the “vilification” of Mihailović had led 
many “to doubt and to wonder,” as one of those that had started to doubt was 
Ambassador Biddle.200  Initially, Biddle appeared to give little attention to the 
accusations of collaboration.  He instead focused on resolving the disputes within the 
YGE and the Yugoslav-American community and persuading the Yugoslav 
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government to pressure Mihailović into brokering a truce with the Partisans.  As he 
told the Yugoslav Prime Minister in January, “the most important point to stress,” 
both for the YGE and its embassy in the US, “was the establishment of unity.”  This 
“unity amongst the Yugoslavs both at home and abroad” would also “overcome the 
opposition of the so-called Communist press.”201  However, in April, 1943, Biddle 
reported his assessment of Mihailović’s denials of collaboration.  He noted that 
Mihailović denied the “allegations in the first person,” which Biddle suspected was 
done in the naive hope of sweeping “aside the question of cooperation by 
[Mihailović’s] ‘lieutenants.’”202      
A letter drafted by Elmer Davis in June 1943 to be sent to the president of the 
SNF indicated that his previous meeting with the foreign-language newspaper editors 
did not succeed in persuading Amerikanski Srbobran’s to adopt a more harmonious 
tone.  It also demonstrated that members of the State Department were not the only 
government officials who were frustrated by the ways in which Pan-Serb activism was 
undermining unity.  Davis wrote, 
for some time, several branches of the United States Government , 
including the Office of War Information, the Department of Justice, 
and the Department of State, have watched with concern the policies of 
the “American Srbobran.”  Its violent attacks upon all peoples of 
Croatian extraction, its strong anti-Catholic articles, and its veiled 
efforts to defend the Quisling [Nedić] who supports the Nazi regime in 
Serbia often have the effect of aiding the Nazi campaign of intolerance 
and race hate… The United Nations are striving for the strongest 
possible unity of all those who are opposed to the Axis.  In Yugoslavia, 
and in the United States, we seek to unite all people of Serbian, 
Croatian, and Slovenian heritage who believe in freedom and 
democracy….203 
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Notably, Davis drew a link between the anti-Croat propaganda of the Pan-Serb 
movement and Nazi “race hate,” an obsession that even drove the Srbobran to support 
a “Quisling.” 
Elements of the mainstream press also took increasing notice, and expressed a 
dim view, of the Pan-Serb ideology and the émigré agitators that championed it.  For 
example, in January 1943, an article in Harper’s explained that 
upon the outbreak of the war… the [SNF] organized the Serbian 
National Defense Committee. Highly Serbian-nationalistic, the 
Committee now spreads across the United States an inflammatory 
propaganda not against the obvious enemies of Yugoslavia—the 
Germans and Italians—but against the Croatians, the Catholic partners 
of the Orthodox Serbs in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and against the 
Croat-Americans. The committeemen preach that Yugoslavia, 
established as a federation of three peoples, is dead, and that the Serbs 
are destined to become a Balkan [Herrenvolk], supreme and lordly over 
the Croats, who have 800,000 cousins in the United States, and the 
Slovenes, who have 250,000.204 
 
The description of the Serb nationalists’ belief that they were “destined to become a 
Balkan [Herrenvolk]” blatantly compared the pursuit of Greater Serbia to Nazi race 
theory.  The article blamed many of the same culprits for perpetuating the Serb-Croat 
dispute as had the State Department, including Amerikanski Srbobran and 
Ambassador Fotić.  As a result of their agitations, “there raged a Balkan-minority war 
of words, emphasized furiously now and then by a monkey wrench flung at a Croat 
factory worker by a Serb on the same arsenal-of-democracy assembly line.”205  This 
suggested that the heroic image of the fighting Serb was under revision now that it was 
exhibiting itself on US soil.  Although the article took pains to specifically 
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disassociate Mihailović from Serb chauvinism, noting that “Croat guerrillas” fought 
under his command, the views it expressed did not bode well for his popularity should 
such a connection gain credence.206  The article also expressed frustration over the 
“elements in the American government that encourage the most reactionary of the 
émigrés” despite the fact that the governments-in-exile knew “that changes [were] 
coming.”207  It did not comment on the fact  that these same émigrés were also 
Mihailović’s most vigorous defenders. 
There was the potential for significant public backlash over the perception that 
the government was colluding with reactionary and collaborationist elements of 
occupied countries.  This was demonstrated after the ceasefire that Eisenhower and 
State Department advisor Robert Murphy negotiated with the Vichy Admiral and 
Vice-Premier Jean François Darlan in North Africa.  As historian John Lewis Gaddis 
remarks, “Despite its justification on military grounds, this arrangement with a 
notorious collaborator provoked violent criticism in the United States and Great 
Britain."208   
An article in The New York Times indicated that the government was sensitive to 
the accusation that its policy was “based upon ‘settled reactionary sentiments.’”  In 
addition to the deal with Darlan, US support of Mihailović was cited as evidence for 
the existence of such sentiments.  “Out of fear” that these accusations might “cause 
serious harm to united action both in this country and elsewhere,” Under Secretary of 
State Welles responded to these charges by clarifying that although the “first” 
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objective of the war was “absolute victory… secondly” the United States had to “work 
to establish a just and lasting peace.”  A critical component of this peace was for 
people to “choose freely the form of government they desire.”  In accordance with this 
aim, Welles insisted that while the US might support Mihailović, this was not a result 
of “favoritism.”  Rather, the US would “aid, to the full extents of [its] ability, any 
group which is fighting the common enemy.  But that aid [would] not be in such form 
as to prejudice a people’s basic right, stated in the Atlantic Charter, to choose its own 
form of government.”209      
By July, 1943, The Nation no longer defended Mihailović against the charge of 
collaboration.  Instead, it described how Mihailović had “accepted the view of the 
partisans claimed by the Germans, Italians, [Ustaše], and separatist propaganda 
bureaus,” which led him to join with the Italians in attacking the Partisans.  This meant 
that “not only had Croat” Ustaše killed “Serbs… but Serbian [Četniks] killed anti-
fascist Serbs and Croats.”  This directly challenged the Manichaean dualism of the 
romantic narrative by calling into question the righteousness of the Četnik cause both 
in regard to Mihailović’s aims and methods, which no longer stood in stark contrast to 
those of the Axis.  As the article went on to state,  
the propaganda of Hitler and Mussolini, given impetus by [Dimitrije 
Ljotić], ideological leader of Serbian orthodox fascism, succeeded in 
convincing [Mihailović] and his political advisers that in the struggle 
between fascism and communism Serbia and its people must fight the 
Communist menace.210 
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threat to Yugoslavia’s existence as nation.  In August, 1943, R. W. Seton-Watson, a 
Scottish historian who was instrumental in guiding the creation of Yugoslavia, 
provided Ambassador Biddle with a memorandum on the British assessment of the 
YGE’s composition.  According to the memorandum, the cabinet was “reactionary, 
[Pan-Serb], anti-Croat, anti-constitutional, and anti-Russian” and had “no backing 
anywhere.”  Mihailović’s retention as Minister of War served as “an open refus to the 
Partisans and Moscow,” and Seton-Watson suspected that Yugoslavs’ perception of 
the YGE would lead the “great majority of patriots away from” Mihailović.  This 
situation threatened the very “survival of [Yugoslavia] itself.”  Seton-Watson also 
admonished that “the Serb and Croat public” could “be excused for assuming that” the 
United and Britain tacitly approved of the YGE’s “reactionary tendencies.”211  
In October 1943, shortly before the pivotal Tehran Conference where the decision 
would be made to switch full Allied support to Tito, Donovan provided FDR with a 
memorandum “on the Balkan situation” that, besides criticizing Mihailović’s “relative 
lack of [military] activity,” also stated that 
the Government-in-Exile anticipates that [Mihailović], with assistance 
from the Allies, will reestablish the monarchy with the present cabinet 
and with Pan-Serbian inclinations.  This is stated in confidence by 
General [Petar Živković], Deputy of the King as Commander in Chief, 
and by Prime Minister [Božidar Purić].  The Government is not 
representative of the population, and causes controversy between 
factions which frequently terminate in grave clashes.  The people are 
irritated that the United States and Britain protect the Government-in-
Exile… these people are also firmly against General [Živković], who, 
under King Alexander, was Dictator.212 
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As this memorandum suggests, Mihailović, the King, and the YGE were haunted 
by the specter of Yugoslavia’s dictatorial past under the rule of King Peter’s father, 
and the accusation of authoritarian ambitions was often leveled by the regime’s 
detractors.  An example of this can be seen in the November 1, 1943 issue of The New 
Republic, in which Heinz Eulau launched a blistering attack upon the YGE and 
Mihailović.  According to Eulau, for “three years [the YGE’s] clever publicity agents, 
with the aid of gullible English and American newspapermen, succeeded in attributing 
the exploits of” Tito to Mihailović.  While it paid “lip-service to democratic ideals,” 
the YGE actually continued to pursue “the reactionary, undemocratic, and Serbian-
nationalist program” directed by the same group that “dominated Yugoslav politics 
ever since King Alexander established a dictatorship.”  Mihailović refrained from 
fighting so that he might “preserve his forces” and make Yugoslavia “a safe place for 
the exiled ruling clique to return.”213  Adamic did his part to undermine the YGE 
along similar lines in The Bulletin of the United Committee of South-Slavic 
Americans.  In its first issue, Adamic provided a breakdown of the positions held by 
the YGE’s constituent members.  He listed Mihailović as the Minister of War and 
“perhaps chief candidate for the future military dictator.”214 
Amidst the concerns about Mihailović that were being raised within the press and 
among government officials, Roosevelt received a highly flattering report about the 
Partisans based upon the observations of OSS operative Major Linn Farish.  
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According to this report, which Roosevelt subsequently shared with Stalin at the 
Tehran Conference, “the Partisan movement [was] of far greater military and political 
importance than [was] commonly realized.”215  The Partisans had “created… a free 
community” consisting of Muslims, “Christians, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Communist 
Party members,” all of whom were allowed to practice “any religion or political 
belief” and freely “express” their opinions.216  Mihailović and the other Četnik leaders, 
on the other hand, were “more concerned with their plans for themselves after the 
war… and thus commenced the bitter civil war which [had] become so savage” that 
Farish found it hard “to see how a reasonable understanding [could] be brought 
about.”217  While the British had once defended Allied support of Mihailović based 
upon the belief that his organization offered the “best prospect of preventing chaos 
after the war,” Farish’s report accused Mihailović of actually being the cause of this 
feared chaos.218 
FDR would not receive the report of Captain Walter Mansfield, a US Marine and 
OSS liaison with the Četniks, until April 7, 1944, but Farish’s counterpart did not 
offer a ringing endorsement of the unifying potential of the Četnik movement.  His 
report confirmed that, while some Četnik officers “believed there should be a 
federation of independent states… under King Peter,” others wanted “a greater Serbia 
which will be the predominating influence in all” of Yugoslavia, and most favored at  
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least an “independent Serbia.”219   
Reporting in much of the American press mirrored Farish’s positive assessment 
of the Partisans.  According to an article in the Chicago Daily Tribune from October 
26, 1943, while the Partisans claimed to represent all of the Yugoslav “national 
groups,” the Četniks were “predominantly Serbian” and appeared “to be anti-Croat 
because of alleged Croatian treachery during” the Yugoslav-Axis conflict.220  In 
December, 1943, Life informed its readers that the Partisans represented “a kind of 
New Deal for Yugoslavia.”221  And although a later article in Life allowed that Tito 
was a communist, it quoted the remarks of “a British observer” that Tito was “a most 
uncommunistic Communist.”  Examples of his “uncommunistic” behavior included 
the ways in which Tito protected “religion and private property.”  The article also 
emphasized the inclusivity of the Partisans, noting that there were “bearded Serbian 
priests” among their ranks, and that “a whole row of respectable conservatives” were 
to be found within AVNOJ.222 
An article titled “Balkan Time Bomb,” in the January 22, 1944 issue of Collier’s 
Weekly demonstrated the substantial revision that the perceptions of Mihailović and 
the Serbs had undergone over the course of 1943.  The article claimed that it was 
“wrong to consider all [Četniks] as great patriots” and even “less accurate to identify 
[Mihailović] as a [Četnik], for he [was] eminently unproletarian and definitely from 
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the top drawer of Serbian society.”223  While Mihailović “splattered” his 
proclamations with “assertions of his loyalty to ‘democracy,’” the article suggested 
that his “personal background” provided the “best clues” to his politics, and stated that 
first of all, he’s a Serb, and the Serbs have always thought themselves 
the chosen people of the Balkans. They modestly admit that what Lord 
Gladstone once said of them is true.  He described the Serbs as “a 
select, a noble and imperial race,” and the story of Serbia is a story of a 
vital, bellicose minority which tried for decades to impose its will—and 
its king—on its neighbors. 
 
Under the subheading of “Feudalism in our Times,” the article described Yugoslavia’s 
“peasant population” as so benighted and poverty-stricken that “when foreign relief 
agencies” provided them with “cocoa, they didn’t know what it was” and used it to 
paint “their huts.”  It ended by warning that although Yugoslavia was “remote,” if its 
problems remained unresolved, the reader “might just as well start getting ready for 
another war.”224  The article left little doubt as to the likelihood that Mihailović was 
the solution to Yugoslavia’s problems. 
After the withdrawal of the military mission to Mihailović, Roosevelt sent King 
Peter a message in May, 1944, in which he insisted that the “sentiments” of the United 
States had “not changed,” and that it remained “pledged to the liberation of 
Yugoslavia and… [hoped] again to see the union of its national elements under 
common government, democratic in form and fact, as the purposes for which” World 
War II was “being fought” required. However, he noted that 
it is one of the misfortunes of the war that your country, battered and 
dismembered by the enemy, has suffered also from internal conflicts, 
which in turn have revived older antagonisms… You speak of the 
Government’s popularity with the people at home.  I wish I could say 
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that our reports from within Yugoslavia confirm this.  On the contrary, 
they indicate that the people in Yugoslavia have sought, and still are 
seeking, a leadership which would have vision for dealing with the new 
social forces at work in the world today….  Let us not forget that the 
[Mihailović] question has become more political than military.   
 
FDR went on to suggest the Mihailović, although he was a “fine soldier,” be 
relieved of his ministerial post.  He also chided the King that “the Partisan 
movement is stronger, and has far greater popular support, and sympathy for it 
extends into larger areas, than your Government has been willing to 
acknowledge…  Any fundamental approach to a solution of the unhappy civil 
strife in Yugoslavia must take this reality into account.”225 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
While the romantic narrative of Mihailović never completely collapsed, it was 
sufficiently called into question to allow for the consideration of Tito as a viable 
alternative for US support.  This rhetorical space, which allowed for the redirection of 
US policy, was in part created by casting doubt upon Mihailović’s politics.  The fact 
that government officials assiduously avoided aligning themselves politically with 
Mihailović demonstrates the degree of this doubt.  Their avoidance was an ominous 
sign for the perpetuation of the romantic narrative, because it signaled that the United 
States and Mihailović were in pursuit of different postwar ends.  The US government 
insisted that these ends had to be subordinated to the primary aim of defeating the 
Axis.  However, in this regard too, the romantic narrative was undermined by 
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accusations that, as opposed to fighting the Axis, Mihailović had aligned himself with 
them in his fight against communism.  Considering the parallels that some Americans 
drew between the Pan-Serb ideology and Nazism, these accusations likely seemed 
plausible to those that believed that this was an accurate comparison.  
Although historian Susan Brewer argues that Americans fought World War II 
“for survival, not ideals,” the concepts of security and ideals were not mutually 
exclusive as they related to American policy toward Yugoslavia.226  American 
awareness of the civil war in Yugoslavia coincided with increasing contemplation of 
the postwar future.  The liberal solution to the Yugoslav threat to postwar peace was a 
democratic Yugoslav government that was representative of its constituent 
nationalities.  Tito’s movement seemed to promise the realization of this desired end 
state.  Also, the emerging romantic narrative of Tito did not conflict with the US 
narrative of unity to the same degree as did the narrative of Mihailović.  Tito’s 
movement appeared to have wide ethnic and ideological appeal, both within 
Yugoslavia and the United States.  In contrast, the tenets of Pan-Serbism had alienated 
not only the majority of Yugoslav-Americans, but also liberals within the press and 
government.  The romantic narrative of Tito complemented the US narrative of unity.  
These narratives combined to create the space in which the reformulation of policy 
might be considered.  While FDR never appeared to completely jettison his pro-Serb 
sympathies, the narrative shift constricted his options, as continued support of 
Mihailović would have been seen by many as a repudiation of American ideals. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE SATIRICAL AND TRAGIC INTERPRETATIONS OF OCCUPIED 
YUGOSLAVIA 
 
On July 8, 1944, William Donovan provided FDR with another report from OSS 
operative Linn Farish, the tone of which was markedly different than the one received 
by the President as he was en route to the Tehran Conference.  Farish began his report 
by praising the OSS officers that had been assigned to both Tito and Mihailović, 
noting that they had all performed admirably within the “perplexing whirl of external 
and internal politics.”  Farish had come to see that the “deep rooted causes of the 
internecine strife” in Yugoslavia were a result of “racial, religious, and political” 
disputations of “such long standing that the people themselves [did] not understand 
them.”  Both the Partisans and the Četniks viewed the other as the other as their 
foremost enemy, and Farish believed that “both sides [were] speaking the truth” in that 
“they [were] their own worst enemies.”  However, the “vast majority” of Yugoslavs 
were “neither Right, Left, Communist, Reactionary,” but instead were a “simple 
peasant type of people, strong willed, hot blooded, with tremendous powers of 
endurance and great personal courage,” who loved “intrigue,” and were “the most 
profound liars” that Farish had “ever met.” 
Farish's report made it apparent that he believed that the US was, at least in part, 
responsible for the “terrible story of misguidance, of rape and death and destruction” 
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in Yugoslavia, for there was only “one great power” that Farish felt “might have 
prevented… or stopped it,” and this had “never been used.”  He explained that  
the United States of America is mentioned in the same breath with God 
in [Yugoslavia].  We were the one nation on earth to whom the people 
believed they could turn for unbiased, unpolitical aid and advice 
without having to pay something in return.  I am speaking now of the 
common man, not Marshal Tito or General [Mihailović]….  It would be 
difficult to express the utter helplessness and frustration which we felt 
in the face of such complete faith in the ability of our country to right 
the wrongs which were so evident on all sides….  They saw in us… the 
representatives of a powerful democratic nation in which people of all 
racial extraction, religions, and political beliefs live side by side in 
harmony, free to speak openly….  In comparison to their own pitiful 
condition… it is not hard to realize why [the United States]… has taken 
on a more rosy hue than it perhaps deserves….  How long can a great 
nation continue not to pay attention to the obligations contained in such 
trust and respect?  How long can a great nation continue in this manner 
and still remain great?   
 
Whereas he had worried “at one time” that the United States was not receiving “proper 
recognition for her participation in supply operations,” Farish now questioned the 
wisdom of wanting such recognition.  This change in attitude was brought about by 
seeing “simple peasant boys” with “bullet holes in them… that resulted from 
American ammunition, fired from American rifles, dropped from American aircraft 
flown by American pilots.”  Because of this, he no longer felt that he could “go on 
with the work in [Yugoslavia] unless… [an] honest effort… [was] made to put an end 
to the civil strife.”227 
Among the modes of emplotment, Farish’s impassioned exhortations fall within 
the category of tragedy.  The tragedy, as described by Krapfl, “is prompted by failure 
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to achieve transcendence [and asks] what flaw of the protagonist’s may have 
contributed to his fall.228  According to Frye, one interpretation of the tragedy is that is 
results from “a violation of moral [emphasis in original] law.”229  The romantic 
narrative of Yugoslav resistance was a call for the US to aid the Yugoslav resistance 
and thus become a co-protagonist in the Yugoslav quest for freedom from Axis 
occupation and the establishment of a just postwar order.  The tragic interpretation of 
US involvement in Yugoslavia claimed that the US had failed to assume this role by 
betraying its ideals and commitments.  The tragic narrative called for a return to 
American ideals and for the US to take an active and constructive role in Yugoslavia.  
As I show in this chapter, the tragic narrative was ultimately unable to overcome the 
governmental inertia caused by the satirical interpretation of the Yugoslav conflict.   
According to Krapfl, the satirical narrative, which is the “militant form of ironic 
employment” allows “virtually no freedom to the hero, and seeks explanations… only 
in social structures.”230  Rather than serving as a call to action, the satirical narrative  
portrays “human agency” as “an illusion,” making “political action… pointless.”231  
“The archetypal theme of irony and satire,” Frye states, is “Sparagmos, or the sense 
that heroism and effective action are absent, disorganized, and foredoomed to defeat 
and that confusion and anarchy reign over the world.”  Notably, Frye defines 
“sparagmos” as “tearing to pieces.”232  Crucial to the rise of the satirical narrative was 
the reevaluation of the primitive, violent, and volatile nature of the Balkans.  Rather 
than portraying these characteristics in a positive light, as was the case with the early 
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romantic narrative, the satirical narrative emphasized the view of the Balkans that 
gave rise to the term “balkanization.”  This should perhaps not be surprising 
considering the similarities between the concepts of balkanization and sparagmos. 
The tragic interpretation of American involvement in Yugoslavia was introduced 
almost immediately after the German invasion.  However, it failed to gain prominence 
within either the press or government circles.  In May 1941, Bess Demaree wrote an 
article for the The Saturday Evening Post that was highly critical of US 
encouragement of the coup.  As she put it, “the Americans” were “chiefly responsible 
for the setting off” of the “explosion which blew apart” Yugoslavia.  In doing so, “the 
Americans… accomplished everything which they set out to do…. They persuaded the 
fiery Serbs to defy the Germans and thus invite martyrdom on their country.”  Even 
though the US knew “that thousands of [Yugoslavia’s] people” would be 
“slaughtered,” they put this “out of their minds” in pursuit of their “war politics.”233  
The United States took advantage of the “almost mystical faith” that Serbs 
“possessed” regarding the “the power and the benevolence of the American people,” 
knowing full well that “thousands of sea miles separated [it] from the Balkans” and 
that the US had neither sufficient supplies nor ships to aid the Yugoslavs in the battle 
that was inevitably to come.234  Demaree concluded that, even though the US had not 
yet entered the war as a belligerent, the only way to “rescue” Yugoslavia would be 
through the use of “American soldiers.”235  While this was certainly a call to action, it 
went unheeded.  “American soldiers” would primarily be introduced into Yugoslavia 
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in the form of downed airmen supplemented by a limited number of OSS operatives 
and other military personnel. 
The YGE and Mihailović were willing to blame the interference of outside  
powers for Yugoslavia’s troubles, but mostly kept their fingers pointed away from the 
United States and toward the Soviet Union and Great Britain.  As the Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union commented in a message to the Secretary of State on October 1, 
1942, “the Soviet press” had stopped mentioning Mihailović and referenced “the 
activities of only the Partisans.”  Based off of conversations with the Yugoslav 
Minister, it was surmised that the Soviet support of the Partisans stemmed from the 
desire to ensure “that on the conclusion of the war Communists or persons 
sympathetic to communism [would] have dominating positions in Yugoslavia.”236  
That the British were not above reproach was made clear in a speech that Mihailović 
ill-advisedly made in front of the head SOE liaison with Četniks.  In it, he accused the 
British of pursuing “their own strategic purposes” and of attempting to “purchase Serb 
blood at the cost of a trivial supply of munitions.”  He could now see “that the Serbs 
were… completely friendless” and that the aim of “the western democracies… was to 
win the war at the expense of others.”237 
The press also noted the problem of outside interference in Yugoslavia and called 
for the US to take a more constructive role in forming a Balkan policy with its Allies.  
As The New Leader stated in an article titled “The Balkan Powder Keg,” the US could 
“adopt the policy of an ostrich and pretend there was no difference between the 
Anglo-American bloc and the Soviet Union” and ignore the fact that Stalin had “long 
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been making preparations for domination of Eastern Europe and the Balkans.”  The 
article predicted that “the Balkan tragedy [was] about to unfold itself in all its horror” 
in a battle between the West and the Soviet Union for “political domination.” It 
warned that “only those who [foresaw] the future [were] destined to govern.”238  
However, the United States had no desire to involve itself in such a contest. 
The title of an article in The Progressive ominously asked “How Can We Avoid 
World War III?” and suggested that the spark for such a conflict was most likely to be 
found in Yugoslavia.  According to the article, US was making “less and less visible 
effort to implement” the principles of “the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter.”  
This was a result of the United States’ focus upon “physical involvement in the war” 
without thinking “about the world after the war.”  This had led to a failure to reach “an 
understanding with the Soviet Union” about Yugoslavia.  The cause of this cataclysm 
was to be the simultaneous invasion of the Balkans by all three of the Great Powers.239    
This joint invasion never materialized in large part because of the American reluctance 
to do so. 
FDR initially seemed amenable to an invasion of the Balkans.  As late as the 
Tehran conference he suggested that an Anglo-American force might cross “the 
Adriatic, for a drive, aided by Tito’s Partisans, northeastward into Rumania to effect a 
junction with the Red Army.”240  However, his interest in this strategy waned over 
time.  This can be seen in a message that the President sent to the Acting Secretary of 
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State on February 21, 1944 in which he stated that he thought “it would be a great 
mistake for [the US] to participate in a military campaign against the Balkans at [that] 
time” and asked him to “take this up with the War Department.”241  Historian Andrew 
Buchanan cites FDR’s suggestion of a Balkan campaign in his argument that the US 
did not suffer from “Balkan-phobia.”242  In making such an argument, he set himself 
against historians such as Barbara Jelavich who argue that “the failure to formulate 
and carry through a clear and coherent policy in Eastern Europe… reflected the 
general lack of concern over the area among” Americans.243  Both of these 
assessments are true.  The United States did not originally suffer from “Balkan-
phobia.”  However, the image of the Balkans was subject to change, and government 
officials acquired this ailment over time.  This in turn gave rise to the incoherency of 
US policy on the Balkans and the appearance that they did not care about the region.  
This aversion to becoming entangled in the Balkans demonstrates the power of the 
satirical narrative. 
Reporting within the American press increasingly portrayed Yugoslav internal 
turmoil as an interminable and inherent feature of the Balkans and contributed to the 
spread of the satirical narrative.  The New York Times explained that “the growing 
strife” in Yugoslavia was “a new expression of an ancient conflict that has long torn 
the Balkan peoples; parts of Yugoslavia are looking… toward Rome and the West, 
part toward Byzantium and the East.”  While it acknowledged the certain individuals 
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were guilty of fanning the flames of the conflict in their pursuit of postwar power, 
there nonetheless existed “great frictions” along “lines of natural cleavage” that were 
“racial, religious, and ideological.”  The article concluded that “more than any other 
country in Europe, Yugoslavia poses the terrible nature of the reconstruction problems 
that the world will face after the war.”244  Commonweal referred to “the anarchy that 
reigns in [Yugoslavia’s] primitive mountain regions,” and noted that even “in the face 
of an enemy as powerful and as hated as the” Nazis, the Partisans and Četniks 
nevertheless “engaged in bloody internecine strife.”  However, this was perhaps to be 
expected, considering that “even… between the two big wars there was intermittent 
fighting between fierce armed bands.”  The article suggested that although “the Big 
Powers have fished these troubled waters” in the past, there were now “more urgent 
problems for the peace than completely stamping out so chronic a flair for violence 
and disorder.”245           
One significant aspect of the satirical narrative was its portrayal of the Yugoslav 
conflict as an ancient religious dispute.  For instance, a previously mentioned State 
Department report on disunity within the Yugoslav-American community identified 
the contributions made by the clergy of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches to the 
Serb-Croat dispute, which it described as the manifestation of a “thousand-year old 
animosity.”246  Even Farish, although undoubtedly unintentionally, lent credence to 
this interpretation of the Yugoslav conflict with his above-mentioned reference to the 
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“racial, religious, and political” disputations of “such long standing that the people 
themselves [did] not understand them.”247  As historian Ivo Banac argues, “because 
South Slavic cultural diversity is really religiously based, there have been numerous 
attempts to link the country’s divisions to religious intolerance.”  He points out that 
World War II was one such instance of this.  Even though “some of the massacres” 
that were committed over the course of the war "became religiously based, [these] 
occurred in the context of occupation… not of a [religious] or even civil war,” a  
term that Banac believes is “much misused.”248  While it is arguably reasonable, if not 
unavoidable, to portray the violent struggle between collaborators and resistance 
forces as a form of civil war, this verbiage redirects the focus upon such a conflict’s 
causes. 
Banac brings up a valid criticism of the use of the term “civil war,” in that this 
term emphasized the Yugoslav contributions to conflict as opposed to the significant 
destabilizing effect of outside interference, to include the activities engaged in by the 
United States.  As previously discussed, these activities included the initial 
encouragement of the coup, which ultimately led to the invasion and occupation of 
Yugoslavia and set the conditions for the violent internal political struggle that 
followed.  The US further destabilized Yugoslavia by supplying both sides of the 
Partisan-Četnik conflict.  Although the US eventually ceased aid to Mihailović, it 
continued to supply Tito indirectly.  In a message to FDR in September 1944, 
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Donovan reported that the US had “made clear” to Tito and Mihailović that it would 
“not support either side in internal political strife.”  However, he then reported that 
approximately “two thousand tons” of supplies, to include “military arms and 
equipment,” were being delivered to the Partisans monthly.  Although the British 
acted as an intermediary, many of the supplies were of American origin.  In summary 
he assured the President that the OSS had been “punctilious in keeping out of any… 
political controversy” and avoided “any entanglement in rivalry between [Mihailović] 
and Tito.”249  This claim seems a bit farcical considering the use to which Tito was 
putting the equipment that he was receiving from the West.   
The United States also contributed to the Yugoslav conflict by encouraging 
violent retribution for collaboration.  For example, one American military liaison 
reported that he had succeeded in May 1944 in convincing a Partisan commander to 
agree “to issue an order stating that any peasant turning [US airmen] over to the 
Germans would be shot.”250  While this may seem to have been a reasonable request 
based upon military imperatives, one is left to wonder what standards of evidence 
were used in determining guilt and meting out justice as a result of this order. 
Ostensibly the US mantra of not becoming politically involved in Yugoslavia 
stemmed from the United States’ commitment to the Atlantic Charter and the right of 
people to choose their own form of government.  This can be seen in memorandum 
from the State Department to the President on December 23, 1944, about British 
attempts to enlist the aid of the United States in convincing the King and Tito to agree 
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on the particulars of forming a new Yugoslav government.  The memorandum stated 
that “it was the hope of” the US government “that genuine efforts [would] be made to 
assemble representatives with sound claim to speak for the broad masses… without 
other influence” in their project of “governmental reform.”  However, the 
memorandum went on to make clear that the true reason that the State Department 
wanted to avoid “the exercise of its influence” was that this “would involve 
responsibilities” that it “considered it should not take in the circumstances, as… the 
future of Yugoslavia may be so vitally affected.”251  The satirical view of 
Yugoslavia’s future undoubtedly contributed to this noncommittal stance.   
The British grew increasingly frustrated with the United States’ non-policy.  On 
January 16, 1945, the Secretary of State was informed that the British were “preparing 
to ‘throw over’ King Peter.”  It also stated that the British Ambassador “had been 
instructed to tell” the State Department that while “it was all very well and good for 
the United States to stall on [the] Yugoslav situation… [the British] could not afford to 
take [the] same ‘waffling’ line.”252 
FDR needed little convincing about the questionable viability of Yugoslavia as a 
country.  As will be recalled, he asked Fotić how the Serbs “could expect to live in the 
future in the same state with the Croats” in late 1941.253  While Fotić’s reliability 
might be questioned in regard to this subject, as his account seemed to favor the Pan-
Serb view, other sources confirm that the President believed this.  According to Robert 
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E. Sherwood, while dining with presidential advisor Harry Hopkins and the British 
Foreign in March 1943, FDR “expressed his [oft-repeated] opinion that Croats and 
Serbs had nothing in common and that it [was] ridiculous to try to force two such 
antagonistic peoples to live together under one government.”  Instead, Roosevelt 
“thought that Serbia, itself, should be established by itself and the Croats put under a 
trusteeship.”  Eden “thought the President’s opinion… a little pessimistic” and 
believed that a united postwar Yugoslavia was possible.254  Further evidence is found 
in a message from FDR to Churchill on May 18, 1944, in which the President asked 
the Prime Minister if he recalled FDR telling him “over a year ago about [FDR’s] talk 
with Peter, in which [FDR] discussed the possibility of three nations in place of the 
one, [King Peter] to be the head of a reconstituted Serbia.”  According to Roosevelt, 
“The King, with real fire in his eyes, remarked that he was a Serb.”  The President 
thought that he and Churchill “should bear some such possibility in mind in case the 
new government does not work out.”  Even though FDR favored “a Yugoslavia,” he 
believed that “three separate states with separate governments in a Balkan 
confederation might solve many problems.”255 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The tragic narrative of Yugoslavia called for policy changes that would relieve 
the suffering of the Yugoslav people.  Whereas the tragic narrative portrayed British 
and Russian influence as baleful, the United States was more often imagined as being 
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above the political fray.  However, the United States’ efforts to remain politically 
disinterested began to give the appearance that the US government was in fact 
politically uninterested in Yugoslav affairs.  This apparent lack of interest resulted, at 
least in part, from the dominance of the satirical narrative.  Viewing the Yugoslav 
conflict as satire was facilitated by Americans’ preconceived notions about the 
Balkans.  Whereas the perceived nature of the Balkans was viewed in positive light at 
the time of the Axis invasion, subsequent internal conflict evoked a pessimistic 
manifestation of balkanism.  Conveniently, the adoption of this view of the Balkans 
also absolved the United States of responsibility for the contributions it had made to 
Yugoslav discord, as this narrative instead emphasized the inherent nature of the 
Yugoslavs themselves as the explanation for their country’s internal turmoil.  Most 
importantly, in regard to the formulation of policy, the satirical interpretation served as 
the foundation for the longstanding beliefs of President Roosevelt.  As this 
interpretation gained credence, this diminished the will of the President or members of 
the State Department to engage in the seemingly Sisyphean effort of solving 
Yugoslavia’s political disputes.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As this paper has shown, an examination of the narratives about Yugoslavia that 
were adopted over the course of World War II provides insight into the factors that 
influenced US policy decisions.  Each policy decision was preceded by the rise of 
particular narrative that called for a particular type of governmental action or inaction.  
The initial dominance of the romantic narrative called for support of Mihailović, 
which the US duly pledged.  The attack upon this narrative, the rise of the romantic 
narrative about Tito, and the comedic narrative of unity, all encouraged a 
reexamination of the United States’ pro-Mihailović policy.  The tragic narrative 
demanded that the US be more proactive in resolving Yugoslavia’s internal turmoil.  
This was countered by the satirical narrative, which encouraged the US to remain 
politically uninvolved in the Yugoslav affairs.  While the US governmental adamantly 
adhered to its insistence that its decisions were based upon military considerations, 
these narratives created the space that determined the scope and direction of those 
decisions.  While I do not claim that narratives were the sole driver of US policy, it is 
apparent that once particular narratives gained dominance, they guided policy-making 
toward a particular course of action and deterred consideration of alternative policies.  
This can be seen in the case of the comedic narrative, which emphasized Yugoslav 
unity and discouraged consideration of the postwar division of Yugoslavia. 
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It could be argued that particular narratives were merely adopted or 
instrumentalized in order to promote desired, predetermined policies.  For instance, it 
is certainly the case that communists intentionally influenced the narratives about 
Mihailović and Tito in order to shift US policy and thus abet a communist revolution 
within Yugoslavia.   However, narratives also served as a basis for why individuals 
perceived of a course of action or outcome as desirable.  The initial romantic narrative 
about Mihailović’s resistance served as an imperative for US support of the Četniks 
that went beyond the consideration of US interests.  This can be seen in the emotional 
message sent by Roosevelt’s son requesting aid to the Četniks.  The dominance of the 
romantic narrative, with its emphasis upon the heroism and victimization of the Serbs, 
also explains why Roosevelt sympathized with the postwar aspirations of the Pan-
Serbs.  Linn Farish’s later report, which epitomizes the tragic narrative, has no 
ostensible political objective.  Rather, the tragedy of the Yugoslav conflict 
necessitated a change in US policy.  An end to the tragedy, in and of itself, was 
Farish’s desired outcome.          
Each narrative presented a version of the “truth.”  Some narratives were truer than 
others in regard to historically verifiable facts.  Mihailović’s resistance, as far as can 
be determined, bore little resemblance to the way in which it was originally portrayed 
to American public.  The Serbs were certainly heroic in resisting the Axis occupiers to 
the extent that they did.  However, the romantic narrative of Četnik resistance could 
not withstand close scrutiny.  This does not mean that narratives gained ascendency or 
declined simply due to the emergence of new information.  Far more important was 
how that information was interpreted.  In the case of the romantic narrative, there were 
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numerous factors that contributed to this process of interpretation, all of which related 
to the way in which Americans viewed their own participation in the war and what 
they construed as the war’s meaning.  While the nature of Mihailović’s political aims, 
or even if he had such aims, is disputed by historians, perhaps what is more relevant is 
that a significant number of America’s liberal cultural producers came to see that the 
Pan-Serb ideology to which they believed Mihailović adhered was the antithesis of 
their own ideals.  In this way, opposition to Mihailović and support for Tito tells us 
more about American society than it necessarily does about events within Yugoslavia. 
The comedic narrative proffered by the US government is perhaps the most 
revealing in this regard.  This might be viewed as the most artificial of all of the 
narratives in that it was more often used as an imperative for proper action than it was 
a description of reality.  The preoccupation of many Americans with the Yugoslav 
threat to unity reflected their concerns about their own society, particularly as they 
related to the problem of race.  While some acknowledged this American problem, 
others lashed out at Serb nationalists as if they were introducing a contagion amongst 
an otherwise healthy American public.  The comedic narrative ultimately benefitted 
Tito as he seemed to offer the panacea to Yugoslav ethnic strife.  And there seems to 
be “truth” to this interpretation as well, if only in hindsight, in that Tito did hold the 
country together throughout his life as the postwar leader of Yugoslavia. 
The tragic narrative might be viewed as the least effective of the narratives as it 
did not seem to meaningfully impact government policy in the ways that those who 
adopted this narrative hoped.  However, the tragedy of US involvement in Yugoslavia 
would have a prolific postwar life.  The historiographical preoccupation with 
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Communist influence can be viewed as a form of tragedy, wherein the United States 
betrayed its ideals and obligations to Mihailović and the YGE due to its naïveté about 
the nature of Tito’s aspirations.   
As an examination of the rhetoric of government officials makes clear, the 
satirical narrative both reflected and likely shaped US perceptions of Yugoslavia.  This 
narrative emphasized another questionable “truth” informed by what can be seen as a 
manifestation of balkanism.  There seemed to be facts upon which to base this 
narrative.  The dispute within Yugoslav did have an ethnic and religious basis.  It was 
also based upon historical grievances.  However, in emphasizing these aspects of the 
conflict, this narrative simultaneously deemphasized the role that the US had played in 
creating and perpetuating Yugoslavia’s internal conflict.  This allowed for the US to 
eschew political involvement in Yugoslavia and wipe its hands of responsibility for a 
conflict that was ancient and intractable.  This does not mean that the satirical 
narrative was opportunistically adopted in order to free the US from an obligation to 
intercede on behalf of the Yugoslav people.  FDR had an apparent genuine interest in 
and sympathy for Yugoslavia.  This interest diminished over time.  The nature of the 
satirical narrative explains, at least in part, this decline and why FDR abandoned his 
stated consideration of a US military incursion into the Balkans.  It also explains why 
his Serbophile sympathies were not translated into a coherent policy.         
Unfortunately, the satirical narrative would again become ascendant within the 
United States as Yugoslavia descended into civil war in the 1990s, and once again it 
engendered American inaction.  As former US ambassador to the United Nations 
Samantha Power wrote in her study of American policy and genocide in Yugoslavia 
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during the dissolution of the state in the 1990s, Hillary Clinton reportedly “gave her 
husband a copy of Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts, a deftly written travel book that 
portrays people in the Balkans as if they were destined to hate and kill.”  It is 
suspected that, after reading this book, President Clinton came to see Yugoslavia as a 
potential “quagmire” and thus desired to avoid US involvement, such as military 
intercession on behalf of Muslim Bosnians who were being slaughtered by Serb 
nationalists.256 
This thesis can be seen as a cautionary tale about the policy-making process 
related to US foreign intervention.  US policy was informed by simplistic 
understandings of Yugoslavia.  The dominance of the archetypal forms of the 
discussed narratives reflected these simplistic understandings.  The adoption of certain 
narratives was undoubtedly facilitated by preconceived notions regarding the Balkans 
and its inhabitants.  This is most apparent in the romantic narrative of Serb resistance 
and the satirical narrative of Yugoslavia’s ancient ethnic and religious hatreds.  While 
these narratives served as easily understandable conceptual frameworks, their lack of 
complexity undermined the development of an accurate or predictive analysis related 
to Yugoslavia.  For instance, the romantic narrative served as a basis for US 
expectations of the Serbs’ willingness and capability to fight the Axis.  This faith 
proved to be misplaced in regard to the initial invasion and subsequent resistance.  It 
also did not take into account the implications of the political aspirations of the Serb 
nationalists and the ways in which these aspirations might alienate members of both 
the Yugoslav and American public.   
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While it is beyond the scope of this thesis, the relationship between narratives and  
foreign policy has the potential to explain the trajectory of other instances of US 
foreign intervention.  For example, the United States initially supported the anti-
communist government of Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam.  However, similar to 
Mihailović’s suspected Pan-Serbism and the YGE’s questionable commitment to 
democracy, Diem’s repressive rule alienated much of the Vietnamese population and 
united communists and non-communists in resisting his rule.  The US eventually saw 
the folly of its policy and “stood aside and gave its blessing to a military coup” that 
resulted in Diem’s assassination.257  Also like Yugoslavia, Vietnam would descend 
into civil war and eventually come to be viewed by Americans as a quagmire.  The 
application of narrative theory might serve as an explanatory model for further 
scholarly research on the course of US policy in not only Vietnam, but also places of 
current US military involvement, such as Iraq and Afghanistan.     
                                               
257 Thomas J. McCormick, America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and 
After, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 147-151. 
 94 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
Adamic, Louis.  “Mikhailovitch: Balkan Mystery Man.”  The Saturday Evening Post, 
December 19, 1942.  Accessed October 30, 2017.  EBSCOhost.  
Bates, Ralph.  “Mihailovich and the Partisans.” The Nation, November 28, 1942.  
Accessed November 10, 2017.  EBSCOhost.  
Bolles, Blair.  “The Stew in the Melting Pot: How a Few Exiles Stir It.”  Harper’s 
Magazine, January, 1943.  Accessed February 20, 2018.  https://harpers-
org.uri.idm.oclc.org/archive/1943/01/the-stew-in-the-melting-pot/.  
Bess Demaree.  “Our Frontier on the Danube.”  The Saturday Evening Post, May 24, 
1941.  Accessed December 1, 2017.  EBSCOhost.  
Brown, Cecil B.  “The Germans are Coming.”  Saturday Evening Post, August 23, 
1941. Accessed February 18, 2018.  EBSCOhost.  
Collier, John and Saul K. Padover.  “An Institute of Ethnic Democracy.”  Common 
Ground, Autumn 1943.  Accessed December 23, 2017.  http://www.unz.org 
/Pub/CommonGround-1943q3-00003?View=PDF&Text=%22Serbia 
%22+AND+%22race%22.  
Committee for a Fair Trial for Draja Mihailovich.  The Question of the Guilt or the 
Innocence of General Mihailovich: Report of the Commission of Inquiry of the 
Committee for a Fair Trial for Draja Mihailovich.  New York: 1946. Accessed 
 95 
 
January 10, 2018.  https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp 
.39015020457944;view=1up;seq=3. 
Danchev, Alex.  Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance: The Second World War 
Diaries of Vivian Dykes.  New York: Brassey’s, 1990.  
Del Vayo, Alvarez J.  “The Balkan Gateway.”  The Nation, July 24, 1943.  Accessed 
December 30, 2017. EBSCOhost. 
Djilas, Milovan.  Wartime.  New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1977. 
Donovan, William and Edgar Mowrer.  Fifth Column Lessons for America.  
Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941.  Accessed 
January 10, 2017.  https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015006997707. 
“The Eagle of Yugoslavia.”  World Battlefronts.  Time, May 25, 1942.  Accessed 
January 10, 2018.  http://time.com/vault/issue/1942-05-25/page/24/.  
Eulau, Heinz H. F.  “Europe’s Exiled Governments.”  The New Republic, November 1, 
1943.  Accessed January 10, 2018.  EBSCOhost.  
“Facts about Yugoslavia.”  Social Justice, April 21, 1941.  Accessed January 3, 2018.  
http://www.unz.com/print/SocialJustice-1941apr21-00011/.  
FDR Library’s Digital Collections.  https://fdrlibrary.org/digitized-collections.    
 “Fifth Column.”  Saturday Evening Post, August 3, 1940.  Accessed February 10, 
2018.  EBSOhost.  
Fodor, M. W.  “The People of Yugoslavia.”  The New Republic, April 21, 1941.  
Accessed January 2, 2018.  EBSCOhost. 
 Fotić, Konstantin.  The War We Lost: Yugoslavia’s Tragedy and the Failure of the 
West.  New York: Viking Press, 1948. 
 96 
 
G-2, Allied Force Headquarters.  The Četniks: A Survey of Četnik Activity in 
Yugoslavia, April 1941—July 1944.  Printing and Stationary Services CMF, 
September, 1944.  
Gervasi, Frank.  “Balkan Time Bomb.”  Collier’s Weekly, January 22, 1944.  Accessed 
February 1, 2018.  http://www.unz.org/Pub/Colliers-1944jan22-
00013?View=PDF&Text=%22mikhailovitch%22.   
Hoskins, Harold B. “American Unity and Our Foreign-Born Citizens.”  The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 220 (March, 1942): 
153-159.  Accessed December 30, 2017.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/1022708.  
Lane, Arthur Bliss.  “Conquest in Yugoslavia.”  Life, September 15, 1941.  Accessed 
August 1, 2018.  https://books.google.com/books?id=q0wEAAAAMBAJ&lpg 
=PP1&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false.  
Lees, Michael.  The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-
1944.  San Diego, California: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1990. 
“Mihailovich Eclipsed.”  Foreign News.  Time, December 14, 1942.  Accessed 
January 10, 2018.  http://time.com/vault/issue/1942-12-14/page/48/.   
Mitchell, Ruth.  “General Mihailovich: The Story of a Frame-Up.”  The American 
Mercury, July, 1943.  Accessed November 20, 2017.  http://www.unz.com 
/print/AmMercury-1943jul-00025/. 
Murphy, Robert.  Diplomat among Warriors.  New York: Pyramid, 1965. 
The National Archives at College Park, Maryland.  Record Group 226.  Entry 210.  
Boxes 60, 68, 180.  
 97 
 
Orwell, George.  “The Freedom of the Press.”  1945.  Orwell Archive at University 
College London Library, Special Collections.  Accessed February 3, 2018.  
https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/orwells-proposed-introduction-to-animal-
farm.  
“Partisans and Chetniks.”  The Week.  Commonweal, October 22, 1943.  Accessed 
February 10, 2018.  http://search.opinionarchives.com.uri.idm.oclc 
.org/Commw_Web/digitalarchive.aspx.  
Peter II, King of Yugoslavia.  A King’s Heritage.  New York: Van Rees Press, 1954.  
Poole, DeWitt C.  The Study of Foreign Political Developments in the United States: A 
New Field of Political Intelligence.  United States Government Printing Office, 
1945.  Accessed November 10, 2017.  https://www.cia.gov/library 
/readingroom/document/cia-rdp89-01258r000100010004-2. 
Pribichevich, Stoyan.  “Tito.”  Life, February 14, 1944.  Accessed February 28, 2018.  
https://books.google.com/books?id=X1QEAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=PP1#
v=onepage&q&f=false. 
Robert P. Joyce Papers.  Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.  
Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946: Subversion and Sabotage during World 
War II Series Two: SOE Operations in the Balkans.  Marlborough, England: 
Adam Matthew Publications, 2007.  
“Tito’s Partisans.”  Life, December 6, 1943.  Accessed February 28, 2018.  
https://books.google.com/books?id=OFUEAAAAMBAJ&printsec=frontcover
#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
 98 
 
The Trial of Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović: Stenographic Record and Documents from 
the Trial of Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović.  Belgrade: The Union of the 
Journalists’ Associations of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 
1946. 
United States Department of State.  Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic 
Papers, 1941:  Volume II.  Europe.  Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1959.  http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711 
.dl/FRUS.FRUS1941v02.  
United States Department of State.  Foreign Relations of the United States 1942:  
Volume I.  General; the British Commonwealth; the Far East.  Washington, 
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1960.  http://digital.library 
.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1942v01. 
United States Department of State.  Foreign Relations of the United States, The 
Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.  Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1943.  http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711 
.dl/FRUS.FRUS1943CairoTehran.  
United States Department of State.  Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic 
Papers, 1942: Volume III.  Europe.  Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1961. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711 
.dl/FRUS.FRUS1942v03.    
United States Department of State.  Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic 
Papers, 1943: Volume II.  Europe.  Washington, D.C.: United States 
 99 
 
Government Printing Office, 1964.  http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711 
.dl/FRUS.FRUS1943v02.  
United States Department of State. “Policy Regarding ‘Free Movements’ in the United 
States.”  The Department of State Bulletin 5, no. 129 (December 13, 1941).  
Accessed February 20, 2018.  https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiuo.ark 
:/13960/t8w96rf2b;view=1up;seq=571.  
United States Department of State.  “Proclamations on Policy Toward Enemy Aliens.”  
The Department of State Bulletin 5, no. 129 (December 13, 1941).  Accessed 
February 20, 2018.  https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiuo.ark 
:/13960/t8w96rf2b;view=1up;seq=572.  
United States Department of State.  Records of the Department of State Relating to the 
Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia, 1930-1944.  Washington, D.C.: National 
Archives, 1982.   
United States Department of State.  “U.S. Note on the Capture of General 
Mikhailovich,” The Department of State Bulletin 14, no. 354 (April 14, 1946).  
Accessed February 3, 2018.  https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=osu 
.32435031338353;view=1up;seq=636.  
United States Department of State, “Yugoslav Reply to U.S. Note on General 
Mikhailovich,” The Department of State Bulletin 14, no. 355 (April 21, 1946).  
Accessed February 3, 2018.  https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiuo.ark 
:/13960/t3fx8vf3m;view=1up;seq=677.  
 100 
 
Van Rensselaer Thayer, Mary.  “Ruth Mitchell: American Chetnik.”  The American 
Mercury, January, 1943.  Accessed January 3, 2018.  http://www.unz.com/ 
print/AmMercury-1943jan-00016/. 
West, Rebecca.  Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: The Record of a Journey through 
Yugoslavia.  New York: Penguin Books, 1994. 
Wilson, Woodrow.  “President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points.”  The Avalon 
Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy.  Accessed December 20, 
2017.  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp.  
Zinder, Harry and George Maranz.  “‘Invisible War’ in Yugoslavia.”  Life’s Reports.  
Life, November 24, 1941.  Accessed December 10, 2017.  https://books.google 
.com/books?id=UU4EAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA3&pg=PA3#v=onepage&q&f=fa
lse. 
 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
 
Alpers, Benjamin.  Dictators, Democracy, and American Public Culture: Envisioning 
the Totalitarian Enemy 1920’s-1950s.  Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2003. 
Bailey, Roderick.  “Communist in SOE: Explaining James Klugmannn’s Recruitment 
and Retention.”  In The Politics and Strategy of Clandestine War: Special 
Operations Executive, 1940-1946, edited by Neville Wylie.  London: 
Routledge, 2012. 
 101 
 
Banac, Ivo.  Forward to Sabrina P. Ramet. Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of 
Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošović.  4th ed.  Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 2002.  
Brewer, Susan A.  Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the 
Philippines to Iraq.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.  
Brown, Archie.  The Rise and Fall of Communism.  New York, NY: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2009.  
Buchanan, Andrew.  American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World 
War II.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.  
Butler, J. R. M.  Grand Strategy, vol. 2, September 1939-June 1941.  London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1957.  
Cripps, John.  “Mihailović or Tito? How the Codebreakers Helped Churchill Choose.”  
In Action this Day, edited by Ralph Erskine and Michael Smith.  New York: 
Bantam Press, 2001. 
Cullinane, Michael Patrick and David Ryan.  Introduction to U.S. Foreign Policy and 
the Other, edited by Michael Patrick Cullinane and David Ryan.  New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2015. 
Dallek, Robert.  Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945.  
New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.  
Deák, István.  Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and 
Retribution during World War II.  Boulder: Westview Press, 2015.  
 102 
 
De Santis, Hugh.  “In Search of Yugoslavia: Anglo-American Policy and Policy-
Making 1943-45.”  Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 3 (July, 1981): 
541-563.  Accessed August 18, 2017.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/260320.    
Drachkovitch, Milorad M.  “The Comintern and the Insurrectional Activity of the 
Community Party of Yugoslavia in 1941-1942.”  In The Comintern: Historical 
Highlights, edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch.  New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966.  
Dunlop, Richard.  Donovan: America’s Master Spy.  New York: Sky Horse 
Publishing, 2014. 
Foot, M.R.D.  Resistance: European Resistance to Nazism, 1940-1945.  New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977.  
Foot, M.R.D.  SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive, 1940-46.  
Rev. ed.  USA: University Publications of America, Inc., 1986.  
Ford, Jr., Kirk.  OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 1941-1945.  College Station, Texas 
A&M University Press, 1992. 
Frye, Northrop.  Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays. 15th ed.  Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2000. 
Fussell, Paul.  Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War.  New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
Gaddis, John Lewis.  Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar 
American National Security Policy.  New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982.  
 103 
 
Gaddis, John Lewis.  The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947.  
New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.  
Gellately, Robert.  Stalin’s Curse: Battling for Communism in War and Cold War.  
New York: Vintage Books, 2013.  
Gilbert, Martin.  The Second World War: A Complete History.  Rev. ed.  New York, 
NY:  Holt Paperbacks, 2004. 
Glenny, Misha.  The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-2011.  
New York: Penguin Books, 2012.  
Hæstrop, Jørgen.  European Resistance Movements, 1939-1945: A Complete History.  
Westport, CT: Meckler Publishing, 1981.  
Herring, George C.  From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relation since 1776.  
New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.  
Howard, Michael.  Grand Strategy, vol. 4, August 1942-September 1943.  London: 
Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1972), 31.  
Hunt, Lynn.  Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution.  Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1986. 
Jelavich, Barbara.  History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, vol. II.  New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983.  
Kennedy, David M.  Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and 
War, 1929-1945.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.  
Kershaw, Ian.  Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis.  New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2000.  
 104 
 
Kimball, Warren F.  “The Second Word War: Not (Just) the Origins of the Cold War.” 
In War and Cold War in American Foreign Policy, edited by Dale Carter and 
Robin Clifton.  New York: Palgrave, 2002. 
Knox, MacGregor.  Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist 
Italy’s Last War.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.  
Krapfl, James.  Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community 
Czechoslovakia, 1989-1992.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013. 
Lees, Lorraine M.  Yugoslav-Americans and National Security during World War II.  
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007.  
Lerche, Jr., Charles O.  Foreign Policy and the American People.  Englewood Cliff, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958. 
Maksić, Adis.  “Priming the Nation for War: An Analysis of Organizational Origins 
and Discursive Machinations of the Serb Democratic Party in Pre-war Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 1990–1992.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 35, no. 3 
(September 2015): 334-343.  Accessed August 1, 2017.  EBSCOhost.   
Martin, David.  Ally Betrayed: The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailovich.  New 
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946. 
Martin, David.  The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder.  San 
Diego, California: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990. 
Mazower, Mark.  Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe.  New York: Penguin, 
2008.  
McCormick, Robert.  Croatia under Ante Pavelić: America, the Ustaše and Croatian 
Genocide.  New York: I. B. Tauris, 2014.  
 105 
 
McCormick, Thomas J.  America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the 
Cold War and After.  2nd ed.  Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1995. 
Michail, Eugene.  “Western Attitudes to War in the Balkans and the Shifting 
Meanings of Violence, 1912-91.”  Journal of Contemporary History 47, no. 2 
(April 2012): 219-239.  Accessed December 11, 2017.  http://www.jstor.org 
/stable/23249185.  
Mitter, Rana.  Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937—1945.  New York: 
Mariner Books, 2014. 
Muir, Edward.  Ritual in Early Modern Europe.  2nd ed.  New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005.   
Pavlowitch, Stevan K.  Hitler’s New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia.  
New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.  
Pavlowitch, Stevan K.  Yugoslavia.  New York: Praeger, 1971. 
Petrov, Vladimir.  A Study in Diplomacy: The Story of Arthur Bliss Lane.  
Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1971.  
Power, Samantha. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New 
York: Harper Perennial, 2007. 
Ristić, Dragiša N.  Yugoslavia’s Revolution of 1941.  University Park: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1966.  
Roberts, Walter B.  Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945.  Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1987. 
 106 
 
Roucek, Joseph S.  “Yugoslav Americans.” In One America: The History, 
Contributions, and Present Problems of Our Racial and National Minorities, 
edited by Francis J. Brown and Joseph Slabey Roucek.  New York: Princeton 
Hall, Inc., 1945.  Accessed February 20, 2018.  https://archive.org/details 
/in.ernet.dli.2015.73984.   
Rusinow, Dennison.  “The Yugoslav Peoples.”  In Eastern European Nationalism in 
the Twentieth Century, edited by Peter F. Sugar.  Washington, D.C.: The 
American University Press, 1995.  
Schreiber, Gerhard, Bernd Stegemann, and Detlef Vogel.  Germany and the Second 
World War, vol. 3, The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 
1939-1941.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.  
Sherwood, Robert E.  Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History.  New York: 
Harpers & Brothers, 1948.  
Smith, Tom W. “General Liberalism and Social Change in Post World War II 
America: A Summary of Trends.”  Social Indicators Research, 10, no. 1 
(January 1982): 1-28. Accessed April 3, 2018.  https://doi-org.uri.idm 
.oclc.org/10.1007/BF00287217. 
Stafford, David.  Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945: A Survey of the 
Special Operations Executive, with Documents.  Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1980.  
Tasovac, Ivo.  American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 1939-1941.  College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 1999.  
Todorova, Maria.  Imagining the Balkans.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.  
 107 
 
Tomasevich, Jozo.  War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks.  
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975.  
Trew, Simon.  Britain, Mihailović, and the Chetniks, 1941-42.  New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, Inc., 1998.  
Van Creveld, Martin L.  Hitler’s Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue.  New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973.  
Walker, Edward W.  Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Breakup of the Soviet Union.  
Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Public Policy Press, 2003.  
Warren, Frank A.  Nobel Abstractions: American Liberal Intellectuals and World War 
II.  Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1999.  
White, Hayden.  Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in 19th-Century Europe.  
Fortieth-anniversary ed.  Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 
2014. 
Williams, Heather.  Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans: The Special Operations 
Executive in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945.  Madison, WI: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2003.  
 
